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1. Introduction 
Many bank regulators, bank managers, and politicians blame fair value accounting for having 
accelerated the recent financial crisis (e.g., Financial Stability Forum, 2009). One response to the 
allegedly adverse effects of fair value accounting has been the introduction of an option to re-
troactively reclassify financial assets that were previously measured at fair value through profit or 
loss or through other comprehensive income into alternative measurement categories. By reclas-
sifying financial assets, a bank can forgo the recognition of unrealized fair value losses deemed to 
be temporary and thus increase its income as well as its regulatory capital during market down-
turns. In this study we examine (1) whether reclassifications of financial assets served as an ef-
fective means of regulatory capital arbitrage during the crisis (i.e., granted regulatory forbearance 
to banks that otherwise would have been at risk of costly regulatory intervention), and (2) wheth-
er these short-term benefits came at the long-term cost of increased information asymmetry and 
adverse selection resulting from financial instruments no longer being measured at fair value on 
banks’ financial statements.  
We address the questions above by studying the accounting choices of an international sam-
ple of IFRS reporting banks following the October 2008 amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7. The 
amendment to IAS 39 introduces the option to abandon the fair value measurement of trading 
assets (apart from derivatives) and available-for-sale assets. The book value of reclassified assets 
is frozen at the reclassification date and subsequent measurement is at amortized cost, with write-
downs recognized only for other-than-temporary impairment losses. The amendment to IFRS 7 
introduces disclosure requirements designed to mitigate the informational effects of reclassifica-
tion. 
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Focusing on the international setting offers at least two advantages compared to the reclassi-
fication option under SFAS 65 and 115 for U.S. banks. First, the reclassification option under 
US-GAAP has been used by few U.S. banks.1 This is due to the low number of U.S. banks apply-
ing fair value accounting on a substantial basis (S.E.C., 2008), as well as to major differences 
between the two accounting regimes. For instance, in contrast to its US-GAAP equivalent, the 
IAS 39 reclassification option could be applied retroactively at the peak of the financial crisis for 
the July to October 2008 period, providing banks exact information about the amount of fair val-
ue write-downs they would forgo when choosing to reclassify. Moreover, the rules for the recog-
nition of other-than-temporary impairment losses that are to be applied after reclassification into 
cost categories are more restrictive under US-GAAP. Thus the extent of write-downs that a bank 
could potentially forgo by reclassifying fair value assets is, ceteris paribus, larger under IFRS. 
The second advantage of the international setting is that it allows us to exploit cross-country dif-
ferences in the link between fair value accounting and capital regulation and hence to identify 
more precisely how prudential supervision may have affected accounting choices during the fi-
nancial crisis. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we empirically analyze the determinants of an indi-
vidual bank’s reclassification choice. To this end, we document and exploit cross-country differ-
ences in the link between fair value accounting under IFRS and the determination of regulatory 
capital (see Barth and Landsman, 2010, for an overview). Major differences stem not only from 
the level of the minimum capital adequacy ratio, but also from the prudential filter for unrealized 
fair value gains of available-for-sale assets. Second, we investigate the short- and long-term capi-
tal market effects of abandoning fair value measurement. We examine short-term reactions by 
                                               
1  In an automated text analysis of the SEC filings of all U.S. banks included in the Compustat Bank File, we identi-
fy only six banks (out of more than 600) that take advantage of the reclassification option during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. This is consistent with the evidence in Laux and Leuz, 2010. 
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identifying bank-specific benefits from regulatory capital arbitrage in the cross-section of abnor-
mal stock returns around both the regulatory announcement in October 2008 and the bank-
specific reclassification announcements. We examine long-term changes in information asymme-
try by comparing the bid-ask spreads of reclassifying and non-reclassifying banks using a differ-
ence-in-differences design. To disentangle the effects of recognition and disclosure, we distin-
guish between banks that fully comply with the accompanying IFRS 7 disclosure requirements 
and banks that withhold information about the reclassified assets. 
Using a comprehensive global sample of 302 publicly traded IFRS-reporting banks, we find 
that more than one-third choose to use the reclassification option, thereby increasing aggregate 
profits by 22.7 billion Euros and firm-specific profits by 44% on average (see also CESR, 2009). 
Further, we document that almost two-thirds of the reclassifying banks do not fully comply with 
the simultaneously introduced IFRS 7 disclosure requirements. Consistent with reclassification 
being an effective means of regulatory capital arbitrage, we find that the risk of costly regulatory 
intervention and the lack of prudential filters for unrealized fair value gains explain the reclassifi-
cation choice at the bank level. We also provide evidence that banks with a high commitment to 
transparency (i.e., those banks that would suffer most if reclassification were perceived as a de-
crease in reporting quality) are less likely to reclassify, consistent with banks weighing the rela-
tive expected benefits and costs in their reclassification decision. Finally, we find that the reclas-
sification choice has capital market consequences. For a small group of banks that suffered severe 
financial difficulties and faced the highest risk of regulatory intervention, the possibility of in-
creasing their regulatory capital ratio through accounting choice is associated with abnormally 
positive stock returns around the announcement of the amendments. In addition, the bid-ask 
spread analysis reveals that, relative to non-reclassifying banks, the perceived information asym-
metry among investors does not rise for reclassifying banks that are compliant with the related 
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IFRS 7 disclosure requirements. In contrast, non-compliant banks experience a significant in-
crease in bid-ask spreads. Additional analyses suggest that this increase is associated with but not 
solely attributable to missing reclassification disclosures. 
Our paper contributes to several threads of the literature. First, we add to the literature on 
regulatory arbitrage (e.g., Ryan, 2007, Chapter 5) as well as the literature on how institutions 
shape financial reporting practice (e.g., Wysocki, 2011) by examining the link between fair value 
accounting and regulatory capital in an international context. More specifically, we study the ef-
fects of country-specific prudential filters on accounting choices using regulatory data gathered 
from a survey of bank regulators in 39 countries. Second, we extend the literature on the capital 
market effects of recognition versus disclosure (e.g., Schipper 2007) by analyzing a setting in 
which the reliability of disclosed information is comparable to the reliability of recognized in-
formation, as the procedures for estimating reclassified assets’ fair value were implemented at a 
time when the fair values had to be recognized. Third, we contribute to the literature on the eco-
nomic consequences of disclosure (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010) by introducing a measure that is based 
on non-compliance with disclosure requirements. Finally, in a broader sense, we add to the cur-
rent fair value debate (e.g., Barth, 2006; Laux and Leuz, 2009, 2010) and the debate on the ef-
fects of accounting standards on the global financial crisis (e.g., Barth and Landsman, 2010; 
Bushman and Landsman, 2010) by providing evidence based on an international sample; prior 
work focuses almost exclusively on the U.S. context (e.g., Bhat et al., 2011; Vyas, 2011).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional 
background. In Section 3 we review related literature and develop our testable hypotheses. Sec-
tion 4 discusses our empirical strategy. In Section 5 we summarize the data and present our main 
results. Section 6 reports the results of additional analyses and Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Background: The October 2008 Amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 
2.1. The Reclassification Option for Financial Assets 
At the peak of the financial crisis in October 2008, the IASB forwent the regular due process 
to issue amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 (André et al., 2009; Howieson, 2011). These amend-
ments allow companies reporting under IFRS to retroactively reclassify financial assets previous-
ly measured at fair value into categories that require measurement at amortized cost (i.e., to effec-
tively abandon fair value accounting for these assets). The IASB decision was preceded by in-
tense lobbying from politicians and banking regulators mainly from Europe (House of Commons, 
2008), which culminated in the EU Commission threatening to amend IAS 39 unilaterally 
(“carve-in”). 
Accounting for financial assets under IAS 39 is based on three different measurement bases: 
fair value through profit or loss, fair value through other comprehensive income (OCI), and 
amortized cost (e.g., Spooner, 2007). Trading securities, derivatives, and financial assets desig-
nated under the fair value option are measured at fair value through profit or loss. Available-for-
sale (AFS) assets are measured at fair value through OCI. Loans & receivables (L&R) as well as 
marketable debt securities classified as held to maturity (HTM) are measured at amortized cost. 
After initial recognition, five types of reclassifications of assets measured at fair value are possi-
ble. The original IAS 39 only allowed the reclassification of AFS assets into the HTM category 
(para. 54). The October 2008 amendment provides for four additional types of reclassifications in 
rare circumstances such as the 2008 financial crisis: trading assets may be reclassified into the 
AFS, HTM, or L&R category, and AFS assets may be reclassified into the L&R category if they 
are debt instruments. Equity instruments are only eligible for reclassification from the trading 
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category into the AFS category. Assets for which the IAS 39 fair value option is used as well as 
financial derivatives are exempt from reclassification.  
For several weeks after the amendment became effective (specifically, until November 1, 
2008), reclassifications could be made retrospectively, taking effect as of July 1, 2008 (para. 
103H). This transitional rule allowed banks to perfectly assess the income and capital effects of 
the reversal of fair value write-downs that would have otherwise been recognized during the 
quarter. In making their reclassification decision, banks were therefore able to consider the ac-
counting outcome with perfect hindsight for four months. 
The five types of reclassifications differ in their accounting consequences. Overall, three ef-
fects on the measurement of assets and the recognition of gains and losses can be distinguished. 
First, reclassifications from the trading category into the HTM or L&R category affect both net 
income and equity if no impairment is triggered, because fair value gains and losses cease to be 
recognized in profit or loss and thus in equity. Second, reclassifications from the trading category 
into the AFS category affect net income but not equity because fair value gains and losses are still 
considered in the revaluation reserve as part of shareholders’ equity but are now reported in OCI 
rather than in profit or loss (unless impaired). Third, reclassifications from the AFS category into 
the L&R or HTM category affect OCI (equity) but not net income because fair value gains and 
losses have not been previously considered in the income statement but rather only in OCI unless 
an impairment had been triggered. IAS 39 impairment rules are identical for L&R and HTM (pa-
ra. 63) and require objective evidence relating to a specific event that a loss is not temporary (i.e., 
a decrease in fair value is not necessarily leading to an impairment). 
The IASB adopted its own version of a reclassification amendment largely to ensure the si-
multaneous introduction of disclosure requirements on the use of the option (House of Commons, 
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2008). These extensive disclosure requirements, which are now part of IFRS 7, mandate the dis-
closure of quantitative information about reclassification amounts and resulting accounting ef-
fects as well as qualitative information about the rare situation that gave rise to the reclassifica-
tion (para. 12A). If a reclassifying bank fully complies with these disclosure requirements, an 
investor is able to perfectly adjust the balance sheet and income statement for the effects of the 
reclassification. As a consequence, a bank’s reclassification choice is effectively a choice be-
tween disclosing fair value information in the footnotes versus recognizing changes in profit or 
loss or in OCI. 
2.2. Consequences for Banks’ Regulatory Capital  
To the extent prudential supervision and regulatory capital are linked to financial reporting, 
reclassifications also affect the regulatory capital that banks report to the national supervisory 
authorities. The effect depends on country-specific regulation. In our 39 sample countries, unrea-
lized gains and losses from trading assets (net of deferred taxes) are fully reflected in tier 1 capi-
tal via retained earnings. Retroactive reclassifications from the trading category thus always af-
fect a bank’s tier 1 capital on a one-to-one basis if accumulated unrealized gains and losses exist. 
Major differences across countries arise, however, from the treatment of accumulated unrea-
lized gains from AFS assets, which are recognized in the revaluation reserves (via OCI). While 
accumulated unrealized losses (after deferred taxes) are fully deducted from tier 1 capital, the 
Basel II framework recommends that accumulated unrealized fair value gains be included in tier 
2 capital using a general discount of 55% to reflect both the risk of market illiquidity and the fu-
ture tax charge (Art. 49(v)). Notwithstanding, implementation of this prudential filter differs sub-
stantially across countries, with different discounts for equity securities, debt securities, and 
loans. For instance, in our 39 sample countries, an average discount of 48.23% is applicable for 
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accumulated unrealized gains on equity securities (including deductions for tax effects), whereas 
accumulated gains and losses on loans classified as AFS are fully neutralized in the determination 
of regulatory capital. Further, debt securities are treated like AFS equity securities in 27 countries 
but like AFS loans in 12 countries (see CEBS, 2007, for an overview of EU member states). The 
higher the filter, the lower is the potential regulatory benefit of a reclassification during a market 
downturn. This effect is both country-specific (dependent on the prudential filter) and firm-
specific (dependent on the sign of the bank’s accumulated fair value gains and losses, that is, of 
the revaluation reserves). 
Consider the following example: A bank reports accumulated unrealized fair value gains 
from AFS debt instruments of CU 100 on July 1, 2008. Until September 30, 2008, the fair value 
of the AFS portfolio decreases by CU 100 (deemed to be temporary, that is, impairment is not 
required under HTM). By retroactively reclassifying the entire AFS portfolio into the HTM cate-
gory before closing the quarterly report in October 2008, the bank can freeze its revaluation re-
serves at CU 100 (the value as of July 1).2 This reclassification may affect tier 2 capital because 
the accumulated unrealized fair value changes before reclassification are positive (negative re-
serves are fully deducted from tier 1 capital). The size of the impact depends on the country-
specific prudential filter. A prudential filter of 100% would result in the reclassification being 
irrelevant for regulatory capital, whereas a prudential filter of 0% would result in the bank avoid-
ing a loss of tier 2 capital of CU 100 (abstracting from any corresponding tax effect). 
While most jurisdictions apply a net approach in determining the adjustments (i.e., the pru-
dential adjustment is based on the aggregate unrealized gains), a few regulators (Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia) require determination on an item-by-item basis (i.e., the prudential 
adjustment is determined for each AFS asset individually). Since IFRS 7 disclosures do not allow 
                                               
2  The amount is amortized over the remaining life of the debt instrument. 
- 9 - 
us to take this regulatory variation into account, and regulatory reports are not publicly available 
in most jurisdictions outside the U.S., we need to approximate the regulatory effect of reclassifi-
cations from or into the AFS category by using the net approach for countries where the item-by-
item approach is applied. 
Finally, a bank’s proximity to regulatory capital restrictions before and after a reclassification 
depends on country-specific regulations because different jurisdictions employ different mini-
mum capital ratios. The Basel II framework recommends a total capital ratio (tier 1 plus tier 2 
capital divided by risk-weighted assets) of at least 8% (Art. 40). While most countries follow this 
recommendation, a few countries require a ratio of 10% or 12% (see Table 1 for details). 
3. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Banks’ Incentives for Regulatory Capital Arbitrage through the Reclassification Choice 
Related Literature 
In this section, we discuss how banks’ reclassification choices may be affected by the con-
tracting role of accounting (in particular, the use of accounting numbers for prudential oversight). 
Our study is related to two streams of literature on accounting choice. First, we add to the litera-
ture on banks’ incentives to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage through their accounting 
choice. Several studies in this area examine loan-loss provisioning for capital management pur-
poses and find systematic use of managerial discretion to avoid violations of regulatory capital 
restrictions (see Ryan, 2007, Chapter 5, for an overview). Ramesh and Revsine (2001) further 
document that incentives to raise regulatory capital affect the timing of U.S. banks’ adoption of a 
new accounting rule for formerly unrecognized liabilities (SFAS 106). Skinner (2008) shows that 
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deferred tax assets were substantially overstated by Japanese banks during the banking crisis in 
an effort to comply with regulatory capital requirements.  
Prior studies on the discretionary use of fair value accounting for regulatory arbitrage fail to 
detect a significant relationship. For instance, Bernard et al. (1995) find no evidence that the 
mark-to-market system then applicable in the Danish banking sector was opportunistically used 
to avoid regulatory costs (during a non-crisis period), and Bhat et al. (2011) find that less capita-
lized U.S. banks do not observe abnormally positive share prices reactions to the FASB’s per-
ceived easing of mark-to-market accounting requirements in April 2009. In contrast to these stu-
dies, we do not analyze the use of discretion in fair value estimates, but rather the choice to ab-
andon fair value measurement of recognized assets and switch from recognition to the disclosure 
of fair values in the footnotes.  
Our analysis contributes to this literature by examining the interaction between bank-specific 
incentives for capital management and prudential supervision at the country level. Prior evidence 
on this interaction relies on broad proxies for the effectiveness of banking supervision (Fonseca 
and Gonzalez, 2008). In contrast, our evidence is based on differences in the inclusion of unrea-
lized fair value changes in the determination of regulatory capital (prudential filter). Moreover, 
by constructing precise measures linking fair value accounting and country-level banking regula-
tion, we add to the growing literature on how institutions shape financial reporting practice (Ball, 
2006; Holthausen, 2009; Wysocki, 2011) as well as to the debate on whether such a link should 
be eliminated (e.g., Barth and Landsman, 2010). 
Second, our study contributes to the literature linking accounting choice to the classification 
of financial instruments. Godwin et al. (1998) find that liquidity risk is negatively associated 
with, and tolerance for income volatility is positively associated with the probability of a proper-
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ty-liability insurer applying fair value accounting to fixed maturity investment securities. Gram-
lich et al. (2001) examine the reclassification of short-term obligations into long-term categories 
and report evidence consistent with firms opportunistically managing balance sheet ratios. Nei-
ther of these studies analyzes the role of capital management incentives in the classification 
choice. In this respect, Hodder et al. (2002) find that the exclusion of unrealized fair value gains 
and losses from regulatory capital following the implementation of SFAS 115 in the U.S. was 
accompanied by an increase in the use of fair value accounting for investment securities by pub-
licly traded banks. This result suggests that the previously existing link between fair value mea-
surement and regulatory capital increased the risk of non-compliance with regulatory covenants. 
Our study differs from Hodder et al. in that their result is derived from a time series of observa-
tions, while our international setting allows us to exploit variation in prudential filters for fair 
value gains and losses in the cross-section. 
Hypotheses 
Management’s incentives to comply with regulatory capital restrictions stem mainly from the 
risk of the regulatory costs that would be incurred if these restrictions were violated and supervi-
sory actions were taken (e.g., Beatty et al., 1995). The supervisory interventions can take various 
forms (up to the forced closure of the bank) and may vary across countries, but they generally 
result in a substantial loss of shareholder value. For example, Jordan et al. (2000) report that on 
average the share prices of U.S. banks drop by approximately 5% around the announcement of 
formal supervisory actions against a bank. We conjecture that if a bank faces the risk of incurring 
regulatory costs, that is, if the bank is weakly capitalized, then all else equal it is likely to use fair 
value reclassifications to increase its regulatory capital during a financial crisis. 
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The regulatory benefits from the reclassification of AFS assets depend largely on the pruden-
tial filters for accumulated unrealized fair value gains. If an AFS asset is reclassified, the revalua-
tion reserve is frozen at the level on the reclassification date, with the reserve included in tier 2 
capital safeguarded against future decreases in cumulative unrealized fair value gains (provided 
that the fair value decreases do not lead to simultaneous impairment write-downs). The less re-
strictive the prudential filter for unrealized gains from AFS assets is (see Section 2 for details), 
the more regulatory capital is at risk and hence the greater the incentive will be to use the reclas-
sification option when a bank expects a decrease in the fair value of its AFS assets.  
Taken together, the above observations lead to our first hypothesis: 
(H1)  The probability of a bank using the reclassification option is positively associated with 
the bank’s risk of violating regulatory capital restrictions and negatively associated with 
the restrictiveness of prudential filters for accumulated unrealized fair value gains. 
Assuming that the market anticipates the economic benefits of a bank’s regulatory arbitrage, 
the stock price reaction around the announcements of the regulatory decision and the bank-
specific reclassification choice should be abnormally positive. This expectation is consistent with 
reclassifications effectively granting regulatory forbearance to international banks. This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
(H2) The stock price reaction to the announcement of fair value reclassifications is positively 
associated with the size of the bank’s (potential) benefits resulting from regulatory arbi-
trage. 
3.2. Economic Consequences of Reclassification Disclosures and Non-compliance 
Related Literature 
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In this section, we discuss how banks’ reclassification choices may affect the informational 
role of accounting. Our study is related to two streams of literature. First, we extend a large litera-
ture that addresses the capital market effects of recognition versus disclosure. Focusing on a 
cross-section of oil and gas firms, Aboody (1996) finds that the stock market reacts to the recog-
nition of write-downs but not to mere footnote disclosures. Similarly, Davis-Friday et al. (2004) 
find that the perceived reliability of liabilities for retiree benefits other than pensions increases 
when the amounts are recognized (after SFAS 106 adoption) rather than disclosed, and Ahmed et 
al. (2006) find that the fair values of financial derivatives are only value-relevant when recog-
nized (after SFAS 133 adoption). Theory suggests that these observations are due to the higher 
cost of acquiring the expertise needed to process the information disclosed in footnotes (Barth et 
al., 2003) or to investors’ lack of time or ability to absorb the less salient information in footnote 
disclosures (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Experimental evidence also points to the role of audi-
tors who view recognized values as more material and therefore permit more misstatements in 
disclosed, as opposed to recognized, values (Libby et al., 2006). In contrast to most of this litera-
ture, we analyze a setting in which the reliability of disclosed information is close to the reliabili-
ty of recognized information because the estimation procedures for the fair values of reclassified 
assets were implemented when the fair values were recognized (i.e., before reclassification). As a 
result, the fair values of reclassified assets are prepared and audited with greater diligence than 
ordinary footnote disclosures. We therefore contribute to this literature by examining the mar-
ket’s perception of fair value disclosures when the reliability of disclosed fair values is compara-
ble to the reliability of recognized values. 
Second, our study adds to the literature on the economic consequences of disclosure (Beyer 
et al., 2010). Extant studies typically rely on subjective measures of voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997) or assumptions with regard to changes in disclosure policies (e.g., Leuz and Ver-
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recchia, 2000; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006). We contribute to this literature by introducing a 
measure that is based on (non-)compliance with disclosure requirements. Due to differences in 
auditing and enforcement institutions across countries (Street and Gray, 2001; Brown and Tarca, 
2005), our international setting offers heterogeneity in the degree of compliance with IFRS 7 dis-
closure requirements. We exploit this heterogeneity to develop a clinical disclosure score. 
Hypotheses 
Economic theory links the quality of a firm’s disclosure and information environment to its 
cost of capital primarily via the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread when market 
makers price-protect against informed traders (e.g., Stoll, 1978; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Di-
amond and Verrecchia, 1991). All else equal, negative effects of fair value reclassifications on a 
bank’s information asymmetry and cost of capital depend on whether this accounting choice is 
perceived to be a decrease in disclosure quality. The general consensus is that fair value disclo-
sures increase financial assets’ value-relevance (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 
1996; see Wahlen et al., 2000, for an overview). Moreover, evidence from surveys conducted by 
the CFA Institute (2008) indicates that financial analysts consider fair value information to be 
useful. These insights suggest that the use of the reclassification option may signal a decrease in a 
bank’s commitment to transparency, at least if the bank had previously built a reputation for its 
reporting quality and the reclassifications affect the accounts in a material way. Managers will 
anticipate these adverse effects of the reclassification choice and weigh the corresponding in-
crease in the cost of equity capital against the regulatory benefits discussed above (hypothesis 
(H1)). Our third hypothesis is thus as follows: 
(H3) The probability of a bank using the reclassification option is negatively associated with 
its commitment to transparency. 
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We exploit heterogeneity in the degree of compliance with IFRS 7 disclosure requirements to 
distinguish between two groups of reclassifying banks: banks that fully comply with these disclo-
sure requirements and banks that do not. If the disclosure requirements are fully met, reclassifica-
tions simply result in formerly recognized fair values now being disclosed in the footnotes. Since 
the different effects of recognition versus disclosure are subject to debate (Bernard and Schipper, 
1994; Schipper, 2007), we do not expect this group of reclassifying banks to experience a change 
in the perceived level of information asymmetry. In contrast, banks that do not comply are with-
holding potentially material information post-reclassification, in which case the perceived level 
of information asymmetry is likely to increase for this group of banks. This discussion leads to 
the following set of hypotheses: 
(H4a) The perceived level of information asymmetry does not change for reclassifying banks if 
they fully comply with the IFRS 7 disclosure requirements. 
(H4b) Non-compliance with the IFRS 7 disclosure requirements is associated with an increase 
in the perceived level of information asymmetry. 
4. Data and Research Design 
4.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
Our sample selection proceeds as follows. First, we identify 702 banks with publicly listed 
equity shares that are classified as IFRS users for financial year 2008 in BvD Bankscope 
(ACCSTAND)3, Worldscope, or Compustat Global (Industry Groups 4310 and 4320). Next, we 
                                               
3  Consistent with the approach in Daske et al. (2011), we check and modify the Bankscope ACCSTAND coding in 
two ways. First, we treat banks from Taiwan as IFRS adopters even if they are classified as Local GAAP adop-
ters, because Taiwanese SFAS 34 and 36 largely correspond to IAS 39 and IFRS 7, respectively; both standards 
have been effective since 2006 and the reclassification amendments were endorsed immediately on October 17, 
2008. Second, we change the classification of Malaysian banks from IFRS to Local GAAP, because the Malay-
sian Accounting Standards Board has decided that FRS 139 and FRS 7, which are the equivalent standards to IAS 
39 and IFRS 7, were not effective before 2010. 
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exclude 264 banks due to missing capital market data in Thomson Reuters Datastream for the 
periods of interest (October 2008 and June 2009 for bid-ask spreads, and January 2008 and 
March 2009 for stock returns). Our initial sample therefore comprises 438 banks. 
The inclusion of non-banking firms in our sample would pose the issue of heterogeneous ac-
counting incentives as accounting choices in the banking industry are largely a result of its indus-
try-specific capital regulation. As a result, we exclude 112 institutions that are not subject to ex-
ternal capital oversight (hedge funds, brokerage houses, and securities firms) or for which we 
cannot retrieve any data on regulatory capital. Due to practical impediments, we further exclude 
24 banks that do not publish a financial report in English, French, German, or Chinese on their 
websites. This procedure results in a final sample that comprises 302 banks from 39 countries.  
For the final sample of banks, we manually collect detailed information on reclassification choic-
es and relevant disclosures from the footnotes to the annual financial statements and all previous-
ly filed quarterly financial statements for reporting periods that end between October 2008 and 
September 2009. In total, we extract data from 544 quarterly, interim, and annual reports. In addi-
tion, we use Dow Jones Factiva and LexisNexis to identify the exact date of the initial public 
announcement of each bank’s reclassification choice. If information on such a public announce-
ment is not available, we define the official filing date of the complete financial statement con-
taining footnote disclosures on the reclassifications as the reclassification announcement date. 
Finally, we collect data on country-specific capital regulation. As a starting point, we use the 
CEBS (2007) report on prudential filters for regulatory capital in European countries to update 
and broaden the information from the Barth et al. (2001) World Bank dataset. To verify this in-
formation, we contact bank regulators from each of the 39 countries represented in our sample to 
gather information on the proportion of accumulated unrealized fair value gains or losses from 
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AFS assets that is excluded from a bank’s tier 1 or 2 capital for each country (see Section 2 for 
details).4 
4.2. Determinants of the Reclassification Choice 
In our first set of analyses, we run the following probit regression to provide evidence on the 
determinants of the firm-specific reclassification choice: 
(AFS)Recl_Dummy   =  β0 + β1 Regulatory Capital Restriction + β2 AFS Prudential Filter 
+ β3 Reporting Quality + Σ βj Controlsj + ε (1) 
We estimate two different specifications with regard to the dependent variable. In the first 
specification, we use the dummy variable Recl_Dummy, which takes a value of one if the bank 
reclassifies trading or AFS assets, and zero otherwise. In the second specification, we use the 
binary dependent variable AFSRecl_Dummy, which equals one if the bank reclassifies AFS as-
sets. We estimate the determinants of AFS reclassifications separately because AFS assets feature 
idiosyncratic characteristics with respect to capital regulation that we can exploit in our identifi-
cation strategy. The independent variables comprise both a bank’s incentives and costs (regulato-
ry costs, commitment to transparency, earnings targets) associated with the reclassification option 
as well as opportunities (percentage of trading and AFS assets before reclassification, existence 
of accounting slack) to use the reclassification option. To account for potential within-country 
correlation among the residuals from equation (1), we calculate standard errors clustered by 
country. 
Regulatory Capital Restriction is the difference between the individual bank’s total capital 
ratio before reclassification (i.e., the 2008 figure adjusted for the reclassification effect) and the 
                                               
4  We also asked whether the amendments to IAS 39 induced any regulatory changes to the determination of regula-
tory capital. None of the responding authorities indicated that this was the case.  
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minimum total capital ratio at the country level (see Table 1). To ease interpretation, the value is 
multiplied by -1, so that a higher value represents a tighter restriction and thus a higher probabili-
ty of incurring regulatory costs.  
AFS Prudential Filter is the proportion of accumulated unrealized gains and losses from in-
vestments in AFS assets that is excluded from the determination of total regulatory capital (tier 1 
plus tier 2). This variable takes the country-specific value (including tax adjustments) for accu-
mulated unrealized gains reported in Table 1 (see Section 2 for details). Since equity securities 
are not eligible for reclassification out of the AFS category, our analyses use the prudential filter 
for debt securities. The filter is set to 0% if a bank reports accumulated unrealized fair value 
losses from total AFS investments (i.e., if the reserves reported for financial year 2008 and ad-
justed for the reclassification effect are negative) and to 100% if a bank indicates that it does not 
determine regulatory capital on the basis of the IFRS financial statements due to country-specific 
options for a transition period. The higher the proportion, the less regulatory capital will be safe-
guarded by a reclassification of AFS assets. In accordance with hypothesis (H1), we expect β1 to 
be positive and β2 to be negative. 
The variable Reporting Quality is a proxy for a bank’s commitment to transparency. Due to 
measurement error inherent in the estimation of any reporting quality metric (e.g., Dechow et al., 
2011; Barth and Schipper, 2008; Schipper and Vincent, 2003), we tabulate results for two differ-
ent approaches and report sensitivity tests using alternative measures in Section 6. First, we use 
the magnitude of accruals (RQ1) as an accrual-based characterization of actual reporting that 
proxies for the extent of discretion used in reporting earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). The magnitude 
of accruals is calculated as a bank’s median ratio of yearly absolute accruals to absolute cash 
flows from operations over the period 1990 to 2008, where we follow Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010) and use pre-tax income before loan loss provisions as a bank-specific proxy for cash flows 
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from operations. We convert RQ1 into ranks, with higher ranks representing higher reporting 
quality, and then scale it between 0 and 1. Second, we use the abnormal bid-ask spread (RQ2) in 
the period prior to the reclassification choice (January 2007 to September 2008) as a market-
based proxy for a bank’s commitment to transparency. The abnormal bid-ask spread is calculated 
as the firm-level median of the quarterly prediction errors during this period (actual log(spread) 
minus predicted log(spread)). To ease interpretation, we multiply the abnormal bid-ask spread by 
-1 so that higher values indicate higher information quality. The predicted bid-ask spread is de-
rived from quarterly regressions of log(spread) on the established control variables log(share 
turnover), log(return variability), and log(market value) using daily capital market data (Stoll, 
1978; Glosten and Harris, 1988). In accordance with hypothesis (H3), we expect β3 to be nega-
tive. 
We introduce two control variables intended to capture a bank’s opportunity to take advan-
tage of the IAS 39 reclassification option. The first control variable, Accounting Slack, reflects 
the possibility that banks could prefer more opaque accounting choices (particularly loan loss 
provisioning) for earnings and capital management than fully disclosed reclassifications. This 
variable takes a value of one if a bank’s loan loss provisions for financial year 2008 are abnor-
mally low, that is, income increasing, and zero otherwise. We follow prior literature (e.g., Beatty 
et al., 2002; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) to estimate the nondiscretionary portion of the 
loan loss provision by regressing loan loss provisions on loan loss reserves (t-1), net charge-offs, 
the change in non-performing loans between t-1 and t, and bank size (the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets) on a yearly basis for the period from 2005 to 2008. All variables (ex-
cept bank size) are scaled by total assets and adjusted for the effect of reclassifications in 2008. 
The 2008 loan loss provision is taken to be income increasing if the actual provision is lower than 
the predicted value. The second control variable, Reclassification Potential, represents the pro-
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portion of financial assets that is eligible for reclassification. This variable is calculated as the 
sum of the book values of trading and AFS assets and scaled by the book value of total assets. 
Book values are the 2008 figures adjusted for reclassification effects. 
Our next control variable is No Loss Target, which controls for a bank’s earnings manage-
ment incentives to use the reclassification option. In the banking industry, the zero earnings thre-
shold has been shown to be of psychological importance for private depositors (Goldberg and 
Hudgins, 2002; Shen and Chih, 2005; Spiegel and Yamori, 2007). A bank that already faces a 
decrease in deposits will thus be inclined to not report a loss that could potentially further under-
mine depositors’ confidence. No Loss Target is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if net 
income in 2008 (adjusted for the effects of reclassification) is smaller than zero. The interaction 
term No Loss Target * Δ Customer Deposits is constructed as a binary variable equal to one if the 
sign of the change in customer deposits between 2007 and 2008 is negative and No Loss Target 
has a value of one. We include the interaction term to capture the proportional marginal effects of 
the interacted variables (Kolasinski and Siegel, 2010). 
Finally, we include two additional control variables. First, we construct a summary measure 
that captures a bank’s direct exposure to the financial crisis (Exposure to Crisis), as reclassifica-
tions could be more likely the more a bank suffers from illiquidity of its assets caused by the cri-
sis. This measure is estimated as the first principal factor using (1) a bank’s stock return perfor-
mance between January and September 2008, (2) the bank’s stock return volatility between Janu-
ary and September 2008, and (3) a binary variable that indicates whether the bank reports securi-
tization activity in its financial statement. Second, we include IIF Membership, which indicates 
whether a bank is member of the IIF. Since the IIF had a leading role in lobbying for reclassifica-
tions, we assume that member firms support its position on fair value reclassifications. 
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4.3. Stock Price Reactions to Reclassification Announcements 
We perform two sets of tests to examine whether regulatory arbitrage through fair value rec-
lassifications has measurable economic effects during the crisis.5 Assuming that capital markets 
are sufficiently efficient, any benefits should manifest in abnormal stock price reactions when 
investors learn about them. The first set of tests analyzes stock price reactions to the announce-
ment of the IAS 39 and IFRS 7 reclassification amendments. The second set of tests examines 
stock price reactions to banks’ eventual reclassification choice.  
The basic regression specification for the first set of tests is as follows: 
Abn_ReturnRegAnn   =  β0 + β1 Expected Reclassification + β2 Regulatory Capital Restriction 
   + β3 Expected Reclassification * Regulatory Capital Restriction + ε (2) 
The dependent variable Abn_ReturnRegAnn is the abnormal return around the regulatory an-
nouncement introducing the reclassification option on October 13 and 14, 2008.6 We estimate the 
abnormal return as the prediction error from the market model using the DJ STOXX 1800 market 
index7 and the period October 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008 as the estimation window. Expected 
Reclassification is a proxy for the unobservable market expectation about a bank’s eventual rec-
                                               
5  We focus on saving regulatory costs as the immediate benefit. In additional tests (not tabulated), we fail to detect 
meaningful and robust short-term reactions to other economic benefits and costs identified in the determinants 
analysis (for example, the avoidance of losing depositors). These effects presumably take more time to material-
ize, are harder to quantify, and are less likely to be unambiguously identified by market participants given the un-
certainties during the financial crisis. 
6  IASB approval of the reclassification amendments was announced in the late afternoon (GMT) of October 13, 
2008, when the stock exchanges in several sample countries had already closed. We therefore use the cumulative 
abnormal return on October 13 and 14, 2008 to ensure that the stock market reaction in all sample countries is 
taken into account. Also note that the reclassification amendments were adopted without due process and related 
discussions did not start until early October 2008 (André et al., 2009). As a result, we do not expect that investors 
anticipated the amendment decision before its official announcement. 
7  The DJ STOXX Global 1800 Index comprises the largest 600 firms, based on free float market capitalization, 
from Europe, North and South America, and the Asia/Pacific region (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010). Since this in-
dex also includes banks, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of the return effect we aim to detect is picked 
up by the market index control variable. However, this impact is likely to be rather small as the DJ STOXX 
Global 1800 contains only 64 of our sample banks (as of December 2008), which works against detecting signifi-
cant abnormal returns. 
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lassification choice. We use three approaches to estimate this proxy. The first approach assumes 
that investors perfectly predict the eventual reclassification choice, that is, Expected Reclassifica-
tion equals one if a bank reclassifies ex post, and zero otherwise. The second and the third ap-
proaches are based on the fitted probabilities from the determinants model in equation (1) using 
the magnitude of accruals (RQ1) and the abnormal bid-ask spread (RQ2), respectively, as report-
ing quality measures. In the latter two specifications, Expected Reclassification takes a value of 
one if the fitted probability is higher than 0.5, and zero otherwise.8 Regulatory Capital Restric-
tion is a dummy variable based on the continuous variable used in the determinants model and 
indicates banks with the highest incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, Regu-
latory Capital Restriction equals one if the difference between an individual bank’s total capital 
ratio before reclassification and the minimum capital ratio at the country level is less than 0% (6 
banks in total; 4 of these banks eventually reclassify), and zero otherwise.9 In order to account for 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation of the residuals, we estimate equation (2) 
using the weighted portfolio approach by Sefcik and Thompson (1986). In accordance with hypo-
thesis (H2), we predict that those banks expected to reclassify experience higher abnormal returns 
when the potential regulatory benefits from reclassification are greatest, that is, β1 + β2 + β3 > β1. 
In the second set of tests, we analyze stock returns around bank-specific announcements. We 
use the first reclassification announcement for reclassifying banks and, as benchmark announce-
ments, the first earnings announcement for non-reclassifying banks following the reclassification 
amendment. Since these dates cannot be identified for all sample banks, the analyses are based on 
a reduced sample of 117 reclassifying and 161 non-reclassifying banks. Of the 117 reclassifying 
                                               
8  We acknowledge that the second and third approaches also require perfect foresight of the reclassification choice. 
However, we think that the determinants model provides a useful tool to condense the information observable in 
October 2008 into one single measure. 
9  The two banks that violated the capital restriction and did not use the reclassification option barely used the fair 
value categories in their 2008 financial statements. In sensitivity analyses, we perform the same tests with alter-
native specifications of Regulatory Capital Restriction; see Section 6. 
- 23 - 
banks, 14 (67) [36] make the reclassification announcement before (during) [after] the respective 
earnings announcement. In addition, 39 of the 117 reclassifying banks announce reclassifications 
in an interim report prior to the first annual report following the amendment to IAS 39. The basic 
regression specification is as follows: 
Abn_ReturnBankAnn    =  β0 + β1 Reclassification + β2 Regulatory Capital Restriction 
+ β3 Reclassification * Regulatory Capital Restriction 
+ β4 Earnings Surprise + ε (3) 
The dependent variable Abn_ReturnBankAnn is the abnormal stock return around the bank-
specific announcement. The abnormal stock return is the prediction error from the market model 
during the announcement window [0, +1], with day 0 being the announcement date. The market 
model is estimated for the intervals (-60, -11) and (+11, +60) using DJ STOXX 1800 as the mar-
ket index. Since some stocks in our sample are thinly traded, we follow the trade-to-trade ap-
proach of Maynes and Rumsey (1993). Reclassification equals one for banks that announce rec-
lassifications, and zero otherwise. Regulatory Capital Restriction is defined as in the analysis of 
stock market reactions to the regulatory announcement (equation (2)). Earnings Surprise is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the earnings number reported at an earnings an-
nouncement is higher than the mean analyst forecast as reported by IBES for the last statistical 
period before the announcement, and zero otherwise. In accordance with hypothesis (H2) and 
similar to the test above, we predict that reclassifying banks with the highest incentives to engage 
in regulatory arbitrage experience higher abnormal returns than other reclassifying banks, that is, 
β1 + β2 + β3 > β1. To the extent that the stock market already reacts to expected reclassifications 
around the regulatory announcement, the predicted effect around subsequent bank-specific an-
nouncements depends on the remaining uncertainty with regard to the reclassification choice and 
its accounting effects. This uncertainty is likely to be a complex function of market expectations 
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around the regulatory announcements and various other factors, particularly the timing of the 
bank-specific announcement relative to the regulatory announcement and competitors’ reclassifi-
cation announcements. We estimate average effects and predict these to be muted around the 
bank-specific announcements. 
4.4. Long-Term Effects on Information Asymmetry 
To examine whether reclassifying IFRS banks experience an increase in information asym-
metry in the long run, we follow related literature (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Muller and 
Riedl, 2002) and use the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. The basic regres-
sion specification is as follows: 
Log(Bid-Ask Spread)  =  β0 + β1 Reclassification + β2 Complete Disclosure  
   + Σ βj Controlsj + ε    (4) 
In equation (4) all variables are measured at the firm-quarter level. The estimation period is 
from 2007Q1 to 2009Q4. Bid-Ask Spread is the median of the daily quoted spread (i.e., the dif-
ference between the closing bid and the closing ask price divided by the midpoint). We use the 
natural logarithm of the bid-ask spread because the raw values of this variable are highly skewed 
(see the descriptive statistics in Table 7, Panel A). Reclassification equals one for all reclassifica-
tion quarters starting with the first quarter during which the respective bank announced a reclassi-
fication, and equals zero otherwise. Complete Disclosure indicates whether a reclassifying bank 
discloses all related items required by IFRS 7 in the footnotes to its financial statements (see 
Tables 1 and 4 for details on this variable). Consistent with hypothesis (H4b), we expect the coef-
ficient estimates on Reclassification to be positive, that is, β1 > 0. Consistent with hypothesis 
(H4a), we expect the coefficient estimate on Complete Disclosure to offset the positive effect of 
β1, that is, β1 + β2 = 0.  
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We estimate equation (4) using a firm fixed effects model that controls for time trends. This 
difference-in-differences approach identifies an association between a treatment (reclassification 
choice) and an endogenous variable (bid-ask spread) by comparing the treatment’s impact on 
affected firms (banks that take the reclassification option) to its impact on unaffected firms 
(banks that do not take the reclassification option). To account for potential cross-sectional and 
serial correlation among the residuals from equation (4), we calculate standard errors clustered by 
firm and quarter (two-way) as suggested by Gow et al. (2010) and Petersen (2009). Since we es-
timate a firm fixed effects model, our set of control variables is restricted to variables that capture 
firm-specific changes over time. Consistent with prior finance literature (Huang and Stoll, 1997), 
we predict that, all else equal, changes in bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated with changes 
in share turnover and market capitalization and positively correlated with changes in stock return 
variability. For all three control variables, we use the natural logarithm because the raw values 
are highly skewed (see the descriptive statistics in Table 7, Panel A). 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Evidence 
Accounting Effects of the Reclassification Amendments 
Table 1 presents details on the sample composition by country as well as selected country va-
riables. More than one-third of our sample (124 banks) chose to take the reclassification option 
during financial year 2008. This proportion is lower than the 61% reported by CESR (2009) for 
large EU banks but is comparable to the descriptive evidence in Fiechter (2011). We find that 97 
of the 124 reclassifying banks take the option for trading securities, while 72 banks reclassify 
AFS assets. Among the banks that reclassify trading securities, 40 institutions transfer assets into 
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cost categories (HTM or L&R), 30 institutions transfer assets into the AFS category, and 27 insti-
tutions transfer assets into both categories (results not tabulated). 
Table 2 shows that the effects of the reclassification choice on banks’ key summary account-
ing figures are quite substantial. Most importantly, the evidence indicates that avoidance of the 
recognition of fair value decreases is only partially offset by impairment write-downs on the as-
sets now measured at amortized cost, suggesting that banks and their auditors treated the declines 
in value as temporary. On average, pre-tax net income is EUR 182.96m or 43.7% higher after 
reclassification. This is equivalent to an average (median) increase of 6.8 (0.5) percentage points 
in return on equity. The pre-tax impact on shareholders’ equity, which includes the additional 
effects from reclassification of AFS securities, is even larger (EUR 287.07m on average). This 
observation provides initial evidence that the reclassification of AFS securities is associated with 
safeguarding regulatory capital and avoiding regulatory interventions. However, the evidence 
also reveals that the positive effects of fair value reclassifications on regulatory capital are driven 
by a relatively small number of banks: only seven banks in our sample increase their regulatory 
capital (total capital ratio) by more than one percentage point. 
Footnote Disclosures of Reclassifications 
While the reclassification amendments to IAS 39 affect the measurement of financial assets, 
informational effects should depend largely on the accompanying IFRS 7 disclosures. Our evi-
dence from the published financial statements of our sample banks reveals that compliance with 
these disclosure requirements varies substantially across countries and banks. Only 42 reclassify-
ing banks (34%) in our sample fully comply with all six requirements laid out in IFRS 7 in the 
first annual report following the amendments (Complete Disclosure, see Table 1). These findings 
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are in accordance with CESR (2009), suggesting that compliance with certain disclosure re-
quirements in IFRS 7 is far from perfect.10 
Further analyses based on reclassification disclosures show that IFRS 7 disclosure practice 
varies by reclassification type (see Table 3, Panel A). In addition, Table 3, Panel B relates Com-
plete Disclosure to various country and bank variables that proxy for the quality of governance 
and enforcement as well as other incentives for transparent reporting. Univariate analyses reveal 
that IFRS 7 compliance is significantly higher in countries with a developed capital market 
(Log(MCAP/GDP)) and in countries with a developed governance system (CGI Score). At the 
bank level, Complete Disclosure is positively related to bank size (Log(Total Assets)) and the 
number of analysts following the bank (Analyst Following).11 The quality of the auditing process 
(Big 4 Auditor)12 and the reporting quality proxies (RQ1 = Accrual Size, RQ2 = Abnormal 
Spread) are not significantly associated with Complete Disclosure. The results are similar in the 
multivariate analyses, although some variables lose their statistical significance. In sum, our ana-
lyses provide evidence that IFRS 7 compliance is positively related to the quality of governance 
and enforcement at the bank and country levels. For descriptive statistics on the country and bank 
variables in this and the subsequent analyses, see Table 4. 
5.2. Determinants of Reclassification Choice 
Table 5 presents the results of multivariate probit regressions explaining a bank’s reclassifi-
cation choice. The table reports the marginal effects evaluated at the mean (median) of the conti-
                                               
10  The finding that required disclosures are not adequately enforced is consistent with the existing literature on 
compliance, particularly in the case of IAS/IFRS (e.g., Cairns, 1999; Street and Gray, 2001; Brown and Tarca 
2005). Given the political controversy surrounding the reclassification amendment, along with its significant ac-
counting effects, it is even more surprising that many banks (still) get away with substantial non-compliance with 
disclosure requirements. 
11  Seven reclassifying banks are cross-listed in the U.S. and therefore registered with the SEC. All of these banks 
provide complete IFRS 7 disclosures. Therefore, a cross-listing/SEC variable cannot be estimated in the probit 
analyses. 
12  Only eight reclassifying banks are not audited by one of the Big 4 auditors. Seven of these banks do not fully 
comply with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7. 
- 28 - 
nuous (binary) independent variables. The analyses differ in the dependent variable used. The 
first two columns correspond to the analysis of total reclassifications, whereas the last two col-
umns focus on AFS reclassifications. In the first column of each specification, the variable Re-
porting Quality is given by the magnitude of accruals. In the second column, the abnormal bid-
ask spread is used instead. Consistent with hypothesis (H1), the results suggest that the closer a 
bank’s total capital ratio is to the country-specific minimum capital ratio, the higher is the proba-
bility of a reclassification (either trading or AFS). Univariate tests (not tabulated) show that the 
distance between a non-reclassifying bank’s total capital ratio and the minimum capital ratio is, 
on average, more than 50% higher than that for a reclassifying bank (6.50 versus 4.29 percentage 
points, p<0.01). In multivariate analyses, the coefficient estimate on Regulatory Capital Restric-
tion takes the expected positive sign and is statistically significant in all versions of the model. 
The marginal effects indicate that a 100 basis point decrease in the total capital ratio is associated 
with a 1.1 to 2.4 percentage point increase in the reclassification probability. Thus, all else equal, 
the reclassification probability of a bank with a capital ratio of exactly the minimum adequacy 
level is more than 6 percentage points higher than that of the average bank in our sample with a 
capital ratio of 5.55 percentage points above the minimum level and more than 36 percentage 
points higher than that of the average bank with a capital ratio equal to the first percentile in our 
sample (33.00 percentage points above the minimum level). These statistics demonstrate that the 
association between capital regulation and accounting choice is economically substantial. 
In addition, the analysis of AFS reclassifications that exploits cross-country differences in 
prudential filters for unrealized fair value gains highlights the importance of incentives arising 
from capital regulation for the reclassification choice. The coefficient on AFS Prudential Filter is 
significantly negative (p<0.05), suggesting that the incentive to reclassify AFS assets is decreas-
ing in the extent to which the accumulated unrealized gains are excluded from the determination 
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of regulatory capital. In line with hypothesis (H2), the incentive is particularly small when reclas-
sifications cannot serve to safeguard regulatory capital, i.e. when the link between prudential su-
pervision and financial reporting is weakest. More specifically, all else equal, a regulatory switch 
from a 0% to a 100% prudential filter on accumulated unrealized AFS gains is associated with an 
approximately 11.5 percentage point reduction in the probability of reclassification. 
The reclassification probability is significantly negatively associated with the proxies for a 
bank’s prior Reporting Quality, suggesting that as hypothesized, banks with a reputation for 
higher quality pre-reclassification reporting are less likely to reclassify. Results are very similar 
using the accounting-based and the market-based proxies (RQ1 and RQ2). This finding may sug-
gest how banks evaluate the informational usefulness of fair value recognition for investors. 
The coefficient estimates on Reclassification Potential are positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the notion that banks need to have a substantial 
trading and AFS portfolios prior to reclassification in order to take advantage of the accounting 
option. Further, the negative association between the reclassification choice and the use of ab-
normally deflated (income-increasing) loan loss provisions in 2008 (Accounting Slack) suggests 
that banks use alternative and more opaque means of earnings and capital management if possi-
ble. Finally, the coefficient estimates on the other control variables provide initial evidence that 
there are other benefits associated with the reclassification choice apart from the reduction in 
regulatory costs, namely, the avoidance of a continued loss in customer deposits (when failing to 
meet the zero earnings target) and of political costs (from membership in the lobbying organiza-
tion IIF). 
The percentage of reclassification choices correctly predicted by the probit model is between 
72% (for total reclassifications) and 80% (for AFS reclassifications). This is an increase of up to 
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36% compared with a naïve prediction model calculated in accordance with Veall and Zimmer-
mann (1996). This ratio corresponds to an (adjusted) Pseudo-R2 (McFadden, 1973) of between 
21% and 24% (17% and 20%). 
5.3. Short-Term Market Effects of Reclassification Disclosures 
Table 6 presents results of our analysis of stock price reactions to reclassification announce-
ments. In the first three columns we focus on the reaction to the regulatory announcement on Oc-
tober 13 and 14, 2008. The tests in the bottom of the table provide evidence consistent with our 
hypothesis (H2) that those banks expected to reclassify experience higher abnormal returns when 
the potential regulatory benefits from reclassification are greatest. Specifically, banks expected to 
reclassify that violate the regulatory capital restrictions have abnormal returns that, depending on 
the reporting quality measure used in the determinants analysis, are between 4.2% (t-statistic 
2.10) and 6.2% (t-statistic 3.11) higher than those of banks expected to reclassify that do not vi-
olate the capital restrictions. In contrast to the coefficient estimates on Expected Reclassification 
and Regulatory Capital Restriction, this effect is not sensitive to the underlying prediction mod-
el.13  
The last two columns of Table 6 present results on stock price reactions to bank-specific an-
nouncements of the actual reclassification choice. The test in the specification with benchmark 
announcements shows that banks that take the reclassification option and violate regulatory capi-
tal restrictions experience abnormal announcement returns that are 2.6% higher relative to those 
of other reclassifying banks. However, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional 
                                               
13  A potential concern is that our tests capture stock price reactions to other economic events that coincided with the 
regulatory announcement of the reclassification amendment. For example, on October 13, the Financial Times 
reports that European governments (among them France, Germany, and the UK) pledged a total of US$ 2,546bn 
in guarantees for new bank debt as part of coordinated plans to rescue their financial sectors. While such events 
almost certainly have an impact on stock prices in general, it is not clear whether they affect the cross-sectional 
differences in abnormal returns that we are interested in. 
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levels (t-statistic 1.53). The coefficient estimate on Regulatory Capital Restriction in the second 
specification is very similar, suggesting that this result is not sensitive to the inclusion of bench-
mark announcements.  
Taken together, our analyses suggest that the stock market reacts positively to reclassifica-
tions if and only if the potential regulatory benefits from reclassification are sufficiently large. 
The stock price reactions are statistically more pronounced for the regulatory announcement than 
for the eventual bank-specific announcements, suggesting that most of the potential benefits are 
anticipated around the regulatory event. Our findings are therefore consistent with hypothesis 
(H2). 
5.4. Long-Term Market Effects of Reclassification Disclosures 
Table 7 presents results for the analysis of long-term consequences of fair value reclassifica-
tions on bid-ask spreads. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and the indepen-
dent variables. Panel B presents results from multi-period difference-in-differences analyses us-
ing the data for all quarters. The first (second) column reports regression results without (with) 
the control variables. The sample comprises 124 reclassifying and 178 non-reclassifying banks, 
for a total of 3,467 firm-quarter observations over the period 2007Q1 to 2009Q4. 
In the first specification, the coefficient estimate on the reclassification dummy is 0.143 (t-
statistic 1.78), suggesting that reclassifying banks that do not comply with corresponding foot-
note disclosures experience a significant increase in bid-ask spreads of over 15% relative to non-
reclassifying banks.14 The negative but statistically insignificant coefficient estimate on Reclassi-
fication + Complete Disclosure indicates that this effect is offset if banks fully comply with the 
reclassification disclosure requirements. The second specification shows that these effects are 
                                               
14  Note that the bid-ask spread regression model is log-linear. The percentage increase in bid-ask spreads is there-
fore computed as exp(0.143) – 1 = 0.154. 
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similar if the control variables are included, although the negative coefficient estimate on Reclas-
sification + Complete Disclosure becomes statistically significant. The coefficient estimates on 
the control variables take the expected signs and are also significant.  
Overall, the empirical analysis provides evidence that is largely consistent with hypotheses 
(H4a) and (H4b), suggesting that the impact of fair value reclassifications on information asym-
metry is associated with the extent to which the bank complies with the corresponding disclosure 
requirements. Specifically, reclassifying banks that fully disclose related fair value information 
experience no change in information asymmetry, while the bid-ask spreads of non-compliant 
banks increase significantly. We acknowledge, however, that interpretation of these results relies 
on strong ceteris paribus assumptions. We therefore discuss potential alternative explanations in 
the next section. 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Alternative Interpretations of the IFRS 7 Compliance Measure 
We perform two sets of analyses to examine whether the statistically significant associations 
between IFRS 7 (non-)compliance and changes in bid-ask spreads suggest a direct impact of the 
reclassification disclosures per se or whether they are more likely to proxy for other effects that 
we do not control for (e.g., a bank’s general disclosure behavior during the financial or the mar-
ket’s perception of this behavior).  
In the first set of analyses, we test whether the observed associations vary with the reclassifi-
cation effects on net income, which we use as a proxy for the materiality of the reclassification. 
The resulting regression specification is as follows:  
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Log(Bid-Ask Spread) =  β0 + β1 Reclassification + β2 Complete Disclosure  
   + β3 Effect on Net Income  
+ β4 Complete Disclosure * Effect on Net Income  
   + Σ βj Controlsj + ε   (5) 
Effect on Net Income is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the percentage net in-
come effect of the first reclassification is above the sample median (see Table 2, Panel A for de-
tails on this variable), and zero otherwise. All other variables are the same as in regression speci-
fication (4). To the extent that potential information asymmetry effects increase with the reclassi-
fication impact on financial statements, we expect the coefficient estimate on Reclassification + 
Effect on Net Income to be positive, that is, β1 + β3 > 0, and to be offset when disclosure is of 
high quality, that is, β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 = 0. The first specification in Table 8, Panel A provides 
evidence that is consistent with these expectations. Specifically, the bid-ask spreads of reclassify-
ing, non-complying banks with a strong impact on net income increase by nearly 40% relative to 
the bid-ask spreads of non-reclassifying banks (see the coefficient estimate on Reclassification + 
Effect on Net Income). In contrast, reclassifying banks that provide full reclassification disclo-
sures experience a decline in bid-ask spreads, regardless of their impact on net income. However, 
this decrease is insignificant or only mildly statistically significant (see, for example, the coeffi-
cient estimate on Reclassification + Complete Disclosure for banks with a modest net income 
effect). These findings are consistent with observed bid-ask spread changes being directly related 
to the reclassification disclosures under the assumption that these changes increase with the size 
of the reclassification effects on net income. 
Notwithstanding the above findings, it is still possible that the magnitude of the reclassifica-
tion effect and the extent of reclassification disclosures are correlated with other omitted factors. 
Therefore, in the second set of analyses we evaluate alternative interpretations for the increase in 
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bid-ask spreads that are unrelated to compliance with IFRS 7 disclosure requirements directly 
related to reclassification. Towards this end, we begin by collecting information on banks’ in-
vestments in toxic Alt-A assets to construct the variable Toxic Assets. This variable takes a value 
of one for all quarters (between the first quarter after the regulatory amendment in October 2008 
and the end of the sample period) in which a bank’s 2008 financial statements indicate exposure 
to or recent losses from investments in the subprime/Alt-A market, including corresponding de-
rivative instruments (CDOs, MBS, etc.) as well as guarantees or credit lines to Special Purpose 
Entities involved in the securitization of such assets, and zero otherwise.15 We then use this vari-
able in two different tests. 
First, we re-run regression equations (4) and (5) including Toxic Assets as an additional con-
trol variable. The second and third specifications in Panel A of Table 8 show that the overall re-
sults change very little. Hence, the existence of toxic Alt-A assets does not explain the significant 
association between reclassification disclosures and bid-ask spread changes, suggesting that a 
simultaneous increase in uncertainty about banks’ asset quality does not seem to confound the 
observed effects. 
Second, we perform a falsifiability test by using Toxic Assets in lieu of Reclassification as an 
independent variable in the spread analysis. We conjecture that an investment in toxic assets is 
positively associated with bid-ask spread changes only if banks imperfectly disclose these in-
vestments. We use the Complete Disclosure variable derived from a bank’s reclassification dis-
closures to capture the interaction between investment in toxic Alt-A assets and disclosure. If the 
observed bid-ask spread effects are specific to reclassifications and unrelated to a bank’s overall 
disclosure policy, we should fail to detect a significant interaction because the IFRS 7 reclassifi-
                                               
15  The data are hand-collected from footnotes to financial statements using a variety of search terms followed by 
thorough analysis of the respective text. 
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cation disclosures do not contain any direct information about banks’ Alt-A investments. Since 
Complete Disclosure is only available for reclassifying banks, we exclude all other banks from 
the analysis. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. We find a positive and statistically signifi-
cant association between Alt-A investments and bid-ask spread changes. This effect is mitigated 
by the significantly negative interaction term between Toxic Assets and Complete Disclosure. To 
the extent that our conjecture above is valid, these findings are consistent with the idea that the 
specific reclassification disclosures are highly correlated with a bank’s general disclosure policy 
during the crisis. Alternatively, these results may indicate that reclassifications are perceived as a 
signal that a bank is hiding additional bad news if its overall disclosure policy (e.g., about its tox-
ic Alt-A investments) is weak. 
Taken together, our additional tests suggest that the increase in average bid-ask spreads pre-
sented in Table 7 is not solely attributable to missing reclassification disclosures. While our re-
sults provide some evidence consistent with a lack of compliance with specific reclassification 
disclosure requirements contributing to the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the general increase 
in spreads during the crisis, our research design does not allow us to disentangle their importance 
relative to other potential drivers. 
6.2. Alternative Reporting Quality Measures 
Our main analyses use the magnitude of accruals and abnormal bid-ask spreads as proxies for 
reporting quality. We perform additional tests to examine whether our results are sensitive to the 
choice of these proxies. The first alternative proxy, RQ3, is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
and equals the standard deviation of the estimated residual of bank-specific regressions that relate 
current accruals to lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations (all scaled by total as-
sets). The second alternative proxy, RQ4, is the negative adjusted-R2 from bank-specific regres-
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sions in which the dependent variable is pre-tax income scaled by the market value at the end of 
the previous fiscal year, and the independent variables are the bank’s 15-month stock return end-
ing three months after the end of the fiscal year, a binary dummy that equals one if the stock re-
turn is negative, as well as the interaction between these latter two variables (e.g., Basu, 1997; 
Ball et al., 2000; Francis et al., 2004). The bank-specific regressions are estimated on a yearly 
basis over the period 1990 to 2008 for both proxies. Both variables are converted into ranks, with 
higher ranks representing higher reporting quality, and then scaled between 0 and 1. 
Similar to RQ1 and RQ2, we find that RQ3 is significantly negatively associated with 
Recl_Dummy (at the 5% level with a t-statistic of 2.11) and AFSRecl_Dummy (at the 10% level 
with a t-statistic of 1.69). We find no evidence, however, of a statistically significant association 
between RQ4 and the dependent variables (with t-statistics of 1.28 and 0.13, respectively). In 
multivariate analyses, the coefficient estimates are insignificant or only mildly statistically signif-
icant (with t-statistics of 1.51 and 1.53 for RQ3 and 0.52 and 1.61 for RQ4). The coefficient esti-
mates for the other variables included in the analysis of Table 5 are unchanged in terms of size 
and statistical significance. 
The main result of the analysis of stock price reactions to the regulatory announcement is 
similar if not stronger when we use the alternative proxies for reporting quality to model market 
expectations about a bank’s eventual reclassification choice. Specifically, using RQ3 (RQ4) as 
the proxy for reporting quality, the average abnormal return of banks expected to reclassify that 
violate the regulatory capital restrictions is 7.0% (6.8%) higher than that of banks expected to 
reclassify that do not violate the capital restrictions. Also in line with the main analyses, this ef-
fect is significant with t-statistics of 3.43 for RQ3 and 1.72 for RQ4.  
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Taken together, the above results corroborate the key findings of our main analyses, but also 
emphasize the innate difficulty of adequately measuring reporting quality.  
6.3. Alternative Definitions of Regulatory Capital Restriction 
The analyses of the stock price reactions to the regulatory and bank-specific reclassification 
announcements are based on a dummy variable that equals one if the difference between an indi-
vidual bank’s total capital ratio before reclassification and the minimum capital ratio at the coun-
try level is less than 0% (i.e., if the bank violates the regulatory capital restrictions before reclas-
sification), and zero otherwise. In additional tests we use two alternative definitions for Regulato-
ry Capital Restriction. First, we apply the continuous variable as described in Table 4. Second, 
we employ the dummy variable approach but use higher cut-off points of 1% (16 banks in total; 8 
of these banks eventually reclassify) and 2% (61 banks in total; 34 of these banks eventually rec-
lassify).  
We do not find statistically significant results when using the continuous variable. In con-
trast, the stock market reactions to the regulatory announcement remain significant when using 
the alternative cut-off definitions. Specifically, banks expected to reclassify that fall below the 
cut-off point of 2% experience average abnormal returns that, depending on the specification, are 
1.4% (t-statistic 1.63) to 2.0% (t-statistic 3.39) higher than those of banks expected to reclassify 
that do not fall below the 2% cut-off. This effect is stronger when we set the cut-off to 1% (ab-
normal returns that are 2.9% to 5.5% higher), but still falls short of the results reported in the 
main analyses that are based on a cut-off point of 0% (abnormal returns are 4.2% to 6.2% higher; 
see Table 6). Overall, these findings emphasize that the stock market reactions to reclassification 
announcements are confined to a small group of banks whose potential regulatory benefits from 
reclassification are greatest. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the magnitude, determinants, and economic consequences of 
banks’ fair value reclassifications of financial assets during the financial crisis following the Oc-
tober 2008 amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7. 
Using a comprehensive global sample of IFRS reporting banks, we find that more than one- 
third of the sample banks choose to reclassify some financial assets. Further analyses suggest that 
abandoning fair value through reclassification serves as an effective means of regulatory capital 
arbitrage for some banks, particularly those facing greater risk of costly regulatory interventions. 
The incentive to use the reclassification option is mitigated, however, by country-specific pruden-
tial filters that temper the link between fair value accounting and regulatory capital. For a small 
subset of banks facing severe financial difficulties, the regulatory benefits are reflected in abnor-
mally positive stock returns around the regulatory announcement. Some banks, however, use the 
reclassification option to withhold potentially material information by not complying with cor-
responding footnote disclosure requirements. These banks experience an increase in information 
asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. 
Taken together, this study provides international evidence that contributes to the ongoing de-
bate on fair value. In addition, the paper’s results might be useful to regulators interested in con-
ducting a post-implementation review of the IASB’s measures during the financial crisis.  
- 39 - 
REFERENCES 
Aboody, D., 1996. Recognition versus disclosure in the oil and gas industry. Journal of Account-
ing Research, Vol. 34, Supplement, pp. 212–32. 
Ahmed, A. S., Kilic, E., Lobo, G. J., 2006. Does Recognition versus Disclosure matter? Evidence 
from Value-relevance of Banks’ Recognized and Disclosed Derivative Financial Instru-
ments. The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 567–588. 
Altamuro, J., Beatty, A., 2010. How does internal control regulation affect financial reporting? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1–2, pp. 58–74. 
André, P., Cazavan-Jeny, A., Dick, W., Richard, C., Walton, P., 2009. Fair value accounting and 
the banking crisis in 2008: Shooting the messenger. Accounting in Europe, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 
3–24. 
Armstrong, C. S., Barth, M. E., Jagolinzer, A. D., Riedl, E. J., 2010. Market Reaction to the 
Adoption of IFRS in Europe. The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp. 31–61. 
Ball, R., 2006. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): pros and cons for investors. 
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 36, Special Issue, pp. 5–27. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., Robin, A., 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on prop-
erties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1–
51. 
Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R., 2001. The Regulation and Supervision of Banks around 
the Word – A New Database. The World Bank. 
Barth, M. E., 1994. Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Investment Securities and the Market 
Valuation of Banks. The Accounting Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 1–25. 
Barth, M. E., 2006. Including estimates of the future in today’s financial statements. Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 271-285. 
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H., Landsman, W. R., 1996. Value-relevance of banks’ fair value dis-
closures under SFAS No. 107. The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 513–537. 
Barth, M. E., Clinch, G., Shibano, T., 2003. Market effects of recognition and disclosure. Journal 
of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 581–609. 
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., 2010. How did financial reporting contribute to the financial 
crisis? European Accounting Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 399–423. 
Barth, M. E., Schipper, C., 2008. Financial reporting transparency. Journal of Accounting, Audit-
ing and Finance, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 173–190. 
- 40 - 
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 3–37. 
Beyer, A. B., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., Walther, B. R., 2010. The financial reporting environ-
ment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 2–
3, pp. 296–343. 
Beatty, A. L., Chamberlain, S. L., Magliolo, J., 1995. Managing financial reports of commercial 
banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings. Journal of Accounting Re-
search, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 231–261. 
Beatty, A. L., Ke, B., Petroni, K. R., 2002. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines 
across Publicly and Privately Held Banks. The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 
547-570. 
Bernard, V. L., Merton, R. C., Palepu, K. G., 1995. Mark-to-market accounting for banks and 
thrifts: Lessons from the Danish experience. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, 
pp. 1–32. 
Bernard, V., Schipper, K., 1994. Recognition and Disclosure in Financial Reporting. Working 
Paper, University of Michigan. 
Bhat, G., Frankel, R., Martin, X., 2011. Panacea, Pandora’s Box or Placebo: Feedback in Bank 
Holdings of Mortgage-Backed Securities and Fair Value Accounting. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, forthcoming. 
Botosan, C., 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, Vol. 
72, No. 3, pp. 323–349. 
Brown, P., Tarca, A., 2005. A Commentary on Issues Relating to the Enforcement of Internation-
al Financial Reporting Standards in the EU. European Accounting Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 
pp. 181–212. 
Bushman, R., Landsman, W., 2010. The pros and cons of regulating corporate reporting: A criti-
cal review of the arguments. Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 
259-273. 
Cairns, D., 1999. The FT International Accounting Standards Survey. Financial Times. London. 
CEBS, 2007. Analytical Report on Prudential Filters for Regulatory Capital. London. 
CESR, 2009. Application of and disclosures related to the reclassification of financial instru-
ments. Paris, Ref.: CESR/09-575. 
CFA Institute, 2008. Re: Amendments to International Accounting Standards no 39 (IAS 39). 
Letter to the EC Accounting Regulatory Committee, London, October 14. 
- 41 - 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., Verdi, R., 2011. Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic 
Consequences around Voluntary IAS Adoptions. Working Paper, University of Mannheim. 
Davis-Friday, P. Y., Liu, C.-S., Mittelstaedt, H. F., 2004. Recognition and disclosure reliability: 
Evidence from SFAS No. 106. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 399–
429. 
Dechow, P. M., Dichev, I., 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual esti-
mation errors. The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, Supplement, pp. 35–59. 
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Schrand, C., 2011. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the 
proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 50, No. 2–3, pp. 344–401. 
Diamond, D. W., Verrecchia, R. E., 1991. Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital. Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 1325–1359. 
Eccher, E. A., Ramesh, K., Thiagarajan, S. R., 1996. Fair Value Disclosures by Bank Holding 
Companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 1–3, pp. 79–117. 
Fiechter, P., 2011. Reclassification of financial assets under IAS 39: Impact on European banks’ 
financial statements. Accounting in Europe, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 49–67. 
Financial Stability Forum, 2009. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Pro-
cyclicality in the Financial System. April 2. 
Fonseca, A. R., Gonzalez, F., 2008. Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by 
managing loan loss provisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 217–228. 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P. M., Schipper, K., 2004. Costs of equity and earnings 
attributes. The Accounting Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 967–1010. 
Gebhardt, G., Novotny-Farkas, Z., 2011. Mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting quality of 
European banks. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 38, No. 3–4, pp. 289–
333. 
Glosten, L. R., Harris, L. E., 1988. Estimating the components of the bid/ask spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 123–142. 
Godwin, N., Petroni, K., Whalen, J., 1998. Fair value accounting for property-liability insurers 
and classification decisions under FAS 115. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 
Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 207–239. 
Goldberg, L. G., Hudgins, S. C., 2002. Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating 
thrift institutions. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 263–274. 
Gow, I. D., Ormazabal, G., Taylor, D. J., 2010. Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-Series 
Dependence in Accounting Research. The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 483–512. 
- 42 - 
Gramlich, J. D., McAnally, M. L., Thomas, J., 2001. Balance sheet management: The case of 
short-term obligations reclassified as long-term debt. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
39, No. 2, pp. 283–295. 
Hirshleifer, D., Teoh, S. H., 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial report-
ing. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1–3, pp. 337–386. 
Hodder, L., Kohlbeck, M., McAnally, M. L., 2002. Accounting choices and risk management: 
SFAS No. 115 and U.S. Bank Holding Companies. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 225–270. 
Holthausen, R. W., 2009. Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting Outcomes, and Enforce-
ment. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 447–458. 
House of Commons, 2008. Banking Crisis: Oral Evidence by Sir David Tweedie, Paul Boyle and 
Michael Izza taken before the Treasury Committee on Tuesday, November 11. London, HC 
144–I. 
Howieson, B., 2011. GFC or KFC?: How Standard Setters were Battered and Fried. Australian 
Accounting Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 3–13. 
Huang, R. D., Stoll, H. R., 1997. The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach. 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 995–1034. 
Jordan, J. S., Peek, J., Rosengren, S., 2000. The Market Reaction to the Disclosure of Supervi-
sory Actions: Implications for Bank Transparency. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 
9, No. 3, pp. 298–319. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2009. Governance Matters. Working Paper, The World 
Bank. 
Kolasinski, A. C., Siegel, A. F., 2010. On the economic meaning of interaction term coefficients 
in non-linear binary response regression models. Working Paper, University of Washington. 
Laux, C., Leuz, C., 2010. Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis? Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 93–118. 
Laux, C., Leuz, C., 2009. The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making Sense of the Recent De-
bate. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 34, No. 6-7, pp. 826–834. 
Leuz, C., Verrecchia, R. E., 2000. The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure. Journal 
of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 91–124. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., Wysocki, P., 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: An inter-
national comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 505–527. 
- 43 - 
Libby, R., Nelson, M. W., Hunton, J. E., 2006. Recognition v. Disclosure, Auditor Tolerance for 
Misstatement, and the Reliability of Stock-Compensation and Lease Information. Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 533–560. 
Maynes, E., Rumsey, J., 1993. Conducting event studies with thinly traded stocks. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 145-157. 
McFadden, D. L., 1973. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In: P. Zaremb-
ka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, New York, NY: Academic Press, pp. 105–142. 
Muller III, K. A., Riedl, E. J., 2002. External Monitoring of Property Appraisal Estimates and 
Information Asymmetry. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 865–881. 
Petersen, M., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 435–480. 
Ramesh, K., Revsine, L., 2001. The effects of regulatory and contracting costs on banks’ choice 
of accounting method for other postretirement employee benefits. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 159–186. 
Ryan, S., 2007. Financial Instruments and Institutions. 2nd ed., Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 
Schipper, K., 2007. Required Disclosures in Financial Reports. The Accounting Review, Vol. 82, 
No. 2, pp. 301–326. 
Schipper, K., Vincent, L., 2003. Earnings Quality. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 17, Supplement, 
pp. 97–110. 
S.E.C. (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), 2008. Report and Recommendations Pur-
suant to Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-
To-Market Accounting. Office of the Chief Accountant, Washington, D. C. 
Sefcik, S. E., Thompson, R., 1986. An approach to statistical inference in cross-sectional models 
with security abnormal returns as dependent variable. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
24, No. 2, pp. 316–334. 
Shen, C.-H., Chih, H.-L., 2005. Investor Protection, Prospect Theory, and Earnings Management: 
An International Comparison of the Banking Industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
29, No. 10, pp. 2675–2697. 
Skinner, D., 2008. The rise of deferred tax assets in Japan: The role of deferred tax accounting in 
the Japanese banking crisis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 46, No. 2–3, pp. 
218–239. 
Spiegel, M. M., Yamori, N., 2007. Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of 
Japanese regional banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 769–786. 
- 44 - 
Spooner, A., 2007. Fair Value and Financial Instruments. In: P. Walton (ed.), The Routledge 
Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting, London: Routledge, pp. 370–384. 
Stoll, H. R., 1978. The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets. Journal of Finance, Vol. 
33, No. 4, pp. 1133–1151. 
Street, D. L., Gray, S. J., 2001. Observance of International Accounting Standards: Factors Ex-
plaining Non-compliance by Companies Referring to the Use of IAS. ACCA Research Mo-
nograph. 
Veall, M. R., Zimmermann, K. F., 1996. Pseudo-R2 measures for some common limited depen-
dent variable models. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 241–259. 
Verrecchia, R. E., Weber, J. 2006. Redacted Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
44, No. 4, pp. 791–814. 
Vyas, D., 2011. The timeliness of accounting write-downs by U.S. financial institutions during 
the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 823–
860. 
Wahlen, J. M., Boatsman, J. R., Herz, R. H., Jonas, G. J., Palepu, K. G., Ryan, S. G., Schipper, 
K., Schrand, C. M., Skinner, D. J. 2000. Response to the FASB Preliminary Views: Report-
ing Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value. Account-
ing Horizons, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 501–508. 
Wysocki, P., 2011. New Institutional Accounting and IFRS. Accounting and Business Research, 
forthcoming. 
 
- 45 - 
TABLE 1 
Reclassification Data and Selected Country Variables 
 
No
Yes No
Australia 8 1 - 1 - - 1 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Prudential Standard APS 111 0.080 55% No
Austria 1 1 1 - - - 1 Financial Market Authority Austrian Banking Act 0.080 30% Yes (25%)
Bahrain 6 3 - 2 1 2 1 Central Bank Rulebook Vol. 1 Part A CA-2 0.120 100% No
Belgium - 2 - 1 1 1 1 Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission CBFA Circular PPB-2007-1-CPB 0.080 100% No
China 10 - - - - - - China Banking Regulatory Commission Capital Adequacy Regulation 0.080 100% No
Cyprus 2 2 - - 2 1 1 Central Bank Directive 436/2006 & 328/2007 0.100 0% Yes (10%)
Denmark 6 4 4 - - 2 2 Finanstilsynet (Danish FSA) Financial Business Act 0.080 100% No
Finland 1 1 - - 1 - 1 Financial Supervisory Authority FIN-FSA Standard 4 0.080 0% Yes (26%)
France 14 5 2 - 3 5 - Central Bank Regulation 90/02 0.080 100% No
Germany 7 7 - 3 4 4 3 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority Regulation KonÜV 0.080 55% No
Hong Kong 6 4 - 3 1 2 2 Hong Kong Monetary Authority Banking (Capital) Rules 0.080 55% No
Hungary 2 - - - - - - Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority HFSA Regulation 0.080 0% No
Ireland - 3 1 2 - 3 - Irish Financial Regulator Notice BSD S 2/00 0.080 0% Yes (12.5%)
Italy 8 13 5 - 8 1 12 Central Bank Circular 263 0.080 50% Yes (27.5%)
Jordan 6 5 3 1 1 1 4 Central Bank CBJ Instructions 0.120 55% No
Kazakhstan - 1 1 - - 1 - Financial Supervision Agency Kazakhstan Banking Law 0.120 20% No
Kuwait 5 4 4 - - - 4 Central Bank Instruction No. 2/BS/94/2002 0.120 55% No
Liechtenstein 2 - - - - - - Financial Market Authority Regulation ERV 0.080 100% No
Lithuania 4 - - - - - - Central Bank Resolution No. 138 0.080 15% Yes (20%)
Netherlands 3 2 1 1 - 1 1 Central Bank Decree on Prudential Rules 0.080 100% No
Norway 8 4 4 - - - 4 Finanstilsynet (FSA of Norway) Capital Adequacy Framework 0.080 100% No
Oman 5 - - - - - - Central Bank Capital Guidelines II.A 0.120 100% No
Philippines 2 9 2 4 3 3 6 Central Bank Circular 538/06 0.100 100% No
Poland 9 4 1 2 1 - 4 Polish Financial Supervision Authority KNF Resolutions 0.080 100% No
Portugal - 5 2 - 3 - 5 Central Bank Notice 12/92 0.080 55% No
Qatar 5 2 - 2 - 1 1 Central Bank QCB Instructions Part 7 0.100 55% No
Russian Federation 2 3 1 - 2 2 1 Central Bank Instruction on Bank Regulation 0.100 100% No
(continued)
Complete 
Disclosure Regulatory Authority Legal Source
Minimum 
Capital
AFS 
Prudential 
Filter
Tax 
Deductions
Country
Reclassifications
Capital Regulation
Yes
Total Total
Only 
Trading
Only 
AFS
Both
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
This table presents the sample composition by country and selected country variables. The full sample comprises 302 listed IFRS-reporting banks from 39 countries. The sample is divided 
in reclassifying (Yes) and non-reclassifying banks (No). A reclassifying bank is defined as a bank that chooses to reclassify fair value assets in accordance with the amendment to IAS 39 in 
financial year 2008. The column Only Trading reports the number of banks that reclassify exclusively trading securities. The column Only AFS reports the number of banks that reclassify 
exclusively available for sale (AFS) securities. The column Both reports the number of banks that reclassify both trading and AFS securities. Complete Disclosure indicates whether a 
reclassifying bank discloses all six items required by IFRS 7, para. 12A, in the footnotes to its financial statements. Regulatory Authority denotes the institution which is responsible for the 
capital regulation of commercial banks at the country level. Legal Source provides the source of our information about the capital regulation variables. Minimum Capital is the total capital 
ratio (tier 1 plus tier 2) required for commercial banks by national regulators (source: The World Bank / own survey). AFS Prudential Filter is the proportion of accumulated unrealized 
gains from AFS debt securities that is deducted from equity in the determination of total regulatory capital (excluding taxes). Tax Deductions indicates the additional deduction of future 
tax charges for accumulated unrealized gains from AFS debt securities in the determination of total regulatory capital (source: CEBS / own survey). Country-specific tax rates are taken 
from the OECD tax survey.  
Saudi Arabia 7 2 1 1 - - 2 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency SAMA Capital Requirements 0.080 55% No
Singapore 4 1 - - 1 1 - Monetary Authority of Singapore Notice 637 0.100 100% No
Slovakia 1 - - - - - - Central Bank Decree 4/2007 0.080 100% No
Slovenia - 2 1 1 - - 2 Central Bank Regulation OJ 135/06 & 104/07 0.080 100% No
South Africa 7 1 1 - - 1 - Central Bank Notice R3/2008 0.095 100% No
Spain 7 1 1 - - - 1 Central Bank Circular 4/2004 0.080 65% No
Sweden 4 3 1 - 2 3 - Swedish Finansinspektionen Regulation FFFS 2007:1 0.080 100% No
Switzerland 6 2 2 - - 1 1 Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA Circular 2008/34 0.080 55% No
Taiwan 4 5 4 1 - 1 4 Financial Supervisory Commission Capital Adequacy Regulation 0.080 55% No
Turkey 5 8 - 1 7 - 8 Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency Regulation OJ 26333/06 0.080 55% No
United Arab Emirates 7 8 6 1 1 - 8 Central Bank Circular 13/1993 0.100 55% No
United Kingdom 4 6 3 - 3 5 1 Financial Services Authority Handbook GENPRU 2.2.185 0.080 100% No
Total / Average 178 124 52 27 45 42 82 0.089 84%
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TABLE 2 
Reclassification Effects 
 
This table presents statistics on the effects of a bank’s IAS 39 reclassification choice on its net income and equity capital. The 
sample of reclassifying banks comprises 124 IFRS-reporting banks from 39 countries (see Table 1 for details). Absolute effects on 
net income are reported in millions of Euros. Absolute effects on return on equity, the tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital (tier 
1 plus tier 2) ratio are reported in percentage points. Relative effects are calculated as the absolute effect scaled by the size of the 
respective variable before reclassifications and are reported in percent. The upper part of the table comprises all reclassifying 
banks. The bottom part of the table focuses on all banks that reclassified exclusively available for sale (AFS) securities, i.e. those 
reclassifications which did not affect net income and tier 1 capital but only the revaluation reserve as part of shareholder’s equity 
and, proportionately (as indicated by AFS Prudential Filter, see Table 1 for details), tier 2 capital.  
Mean Median Mean Std. Dev. P1 Median P99
All Reclassfications (N = 124)
Net Income 182.960 4.978 43.74% 132.75% -6.45% 3.41% 790.91%
Return on Equity 6.758 0.449 47.36% 141.50% -12.38% 3.71% 790.91%
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.174 0.063 2.05% 4.58% -2.24% 0.65% 18.36%
Total Capital Ratio 0.332 0.102 19.58% 191.95% -1.96% 0.86% 28.44%
AFS Reclassifications Only (N = 27)
Total Capital Ratio 0.331 0.093 2.58% 3.50% -0.88% 0.90% 11.62%
Absolute Effects Relative Effects
Variables
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TABLE 3 
Reclassification Disclosures 
 
 
This table presents descriptive evidence on reclassification disclosures in the first annual report following the amendment to IAS 
39. Panel A shows the number and the percentage of banks that disclose selected items required by IFRS 7 across three different 
types of reclassifications (HFT2Cost = reclassification out of the trading account into the HTM or L&R category, HFT2AFS = 
reclassification out of the trading account into the AFS category, AFS2Cost = reclassification out of the AFS category into the 
HTM or L&R category). Panel B shows the results from univariate and multivariate probit regressions that relate the reclassifica-
tion disclosure strategy to various country and bank variables. The dependent variable Complete Disclosure is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one (zero) if a reclassifying bank discloses all (less than) six items required by IFRS 7, para. 12A, in the 
footnotes to its financial statements (see Table 1). All independent variables are described in Table 4. The table reports marginal 
effects at the mean (median) of all continuous (binary) independent variables and z-statistics in parentheses. The z-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors. The proportion of correct predictions is scaled according to Veall and Zimmermann (1996). 
McFadden’s (adjusted) R-squared is calculated according to McFadden (1973). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Panel A: Reclassification Disclosures 
Amount Reclassified IFRS 7.12A (a) 65 (97%) 54 (95%) 69 (96%)
New Category IFRS 7.12A (a) 66 (99%) 57 (100%) 72 (100%)
FV of Reclassified Assets at BS Date IFRS 7.12A (b) 62 (93%) 49 (86%) 66 (92%)
BV of Reclassified Assets at BS Date IFRS 7.12A (b) 62 (93%) not applicable 63 (88%)
Reason for Reclassification IFRS 7.12A (c) 49 (73%) 38 (67%) 59 (82%)
Income / OCI Before Reclassification IFRS 7.12A (d) 44 (66%) 35 (61%) 47 (65%)
Effect of Reclassification on Income / OCI IFRS 7.12A (e) 59 (88%) 50 (88%) 59 (82%)
Effective Interest Rate IFRS 7.12A (f) 38 (57%) 23 (40%) 46 (64%)
Estimated Cash Flow Recovery IFRS 7.12A (f) 33 (49%) 18 (32%) 37 (51%)
Type of Reclassification
HFT2Cost HFT2AFS AFS2Cost
Panel B: Determinants of Complete Disclosure
Univariate Multivariate
0.168 0.192
(2.51)** (2.57)**
0.160 -0.024
(2.35)** (-0.25)
0.098 0.132
(4.04)*** (2.91)***
0.012 -0.008
(2.72)*** (-1.12)
0.245 0.174
(1.50) (0.92)
-0.134 -0.090
(-0.85) (-0.53)
0.019 -0.042
(0.30) (-0.64)
Intercept Yes
# Observations 124 124
Correct predictions (scaled) 0.79 (0.38)
McFadden's (adjusted) R-squared 0.21 (0.11)
Dependent Variable: Complete Disclosure
Log(MCAP/GDP)
CGI Score
Big 4 Auditor
Analyst Following
RQ2 = Abnormal Spread
Log(Total Assets)
RQ1 = Accrual Size
Indepedent Variables
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses of the determinants of reclassification choices (Table 
5) and disclosure strategies (Table 3, Panel B). The descriptive statistics are based on the full sample of 302 banks (Panel A) or 39 
countries (Panel B), respectively. Analyst Following is the number of analysts that follow the respective bank at the end of finan-
cial year 2008 (source: IBES). Big 4 Auditor is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank’s 2008 financial statements 
are audited by one of the big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise (source: BvD BankScope). ∆ Customer Deposits is a dummy variable 
for banks that experience a decrease in customer deposits, scaled by total liabilities, between financial years 2007 and 2008 that is 
greater than the median value (source: BvD Bankscope). Existence of Accounting Slack takes a value of one if a bank uses in-
come-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions in financial year 2008. We use the following regression model to estimate the non-
discretionary portion of the loan loss provision (yearly data over the period 2005 to 2008): Loan Loss Provisions / Total Assets = 
β0 + β1 Loan Loss Reserves t-1 / Total Assets + β2 Net Charge-Offs / Total Assets + β3 Δ Non-Performing Loans / Total Assets + 
β4 Log(Total Assets) + ε. Exposure to Crisis is the extent to which a bank is affected by the global financial crisis in 2008. It is the 
first principal factor of the following three variables: (1) Stock Return is a bank’s cumulative stock return between January and 
September 2008 (source: Thomson Reuters Datastream), (2) Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of a bank’s daily 
stock return between January and September 2008 (source: Thomson Reuters Datastream), (3) Securitization Activity equals one if 
the bank reports engagements in securitizations in its financial statement, and zero otherwise (source: own data). IIF Membership 
equals one if a bank is a member of the International Institute of Finance, and zero otherwise (source: IIF). No Loss Target takes a 
value of one if net income before reclassifications is smaller than zero, and zero otherwise. Regulatory AFS Prudential Filter is 
the proportion of accumulated unrealized gains from AFS debt securities that is not included in the determination of total regula-
tory capital. The variable takes the country-specific value (including tax adjustments) reported in Table 1. It is set at 0% if a bank 
reports accumulated unrealized fair value losses from total AFS investments and at 100% if a bank indicates that it does not de-
termine regulatory capital on the basis of the IFRS financial statements due to country-specific options. Regulatory Capital Re-
striction represents capital management incentives to reclassify fair value assets, which are defined as the difference between the 
minimum capital ratio at country level (as presented in Table 1) and the individual bank’s total capital ratio for 2008 adjusted for 
the effect of reclassifications. RQ1 = Accrual Size is defined as a bank’s median ratio of absolute accruals to absolute cash flows 
from operations over the period 1990 to 2008. We use pre-tax income before loan loss provisions as a bank-specific measure of 
cash flows from operations. The variable is converted into ranks with higher ranks representing higher reporting quality and then 
scaled on the range between 0 and 1. RQ2 = Abnormal Spread is the abnormal bid-ask spread in the period prior to the reclassifi-
cation choice (January 2007 to September 2008). The abnormal bid-ask spread is calculated as the firm-level median of the quar-
terly prediction errors during this period (actual log(spread) minus predicted log(spread)). We multiply the abnormal bid-ask
Panel A: Bank Variables
Variables # Banks Mean Std. Dev. P1 Median P99
Analyst Following 302 7.040 8.452 0.000 4.000 34.000
Big 4 Auditor 302 0.924 0.266 0.000 1.000 1.000
∆ Customer Deposits 302 0.500 0.501 0.000 0.500 1.000
Existence of Accounting Slack 302 0.477 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Exposure to Crisis 302 0.000 0.646 -1.204 -0.031 1.770
IIF Membership 302 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000
No Loss Target 302 0.149 0.357 0.000 0.000 1.000
Reclassification Potential 302 0.109 0.096 0.000 0.083 0.449
Regulatory AFS Prudential Filter 302 0.619 0.402 0.000 0.550 1.000
Regulatory Capital Restriction 302 -5.567 6.839 -33.639 -3.908 0.700
RQ1 = Accrual Size 302 -0.502 0.289 -0.990 -0.502 -0.013
RQ2 = Abnormal Spread 302 -0.019 0.698 -1.702 0.787 1.259
Total Assets 302 127,127 371,986 276 11,444 2,105,760
Toxic Assets 302 0.197 0.400 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Country Variables
Variables # Countries Mean Std. Dev. P1 Median P99
MCAP/GDP 39 1.206 0.959 0.084 1.022 5.005
CGI Score 39 0.929 0.731 -0.678 0.915 1.970
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
spread by -1, the variable is thus increasing in a bank’s reporting quality. The predicted bid-ask spread is derived from quarterly 
regressions of log(spread) on the control variables log(share turnover), log(return variability), and log(market value) using daily 
capital market data. For further details on the variables and the regression approach, see Table 7. Reclassification Potential is the 
proportion of trading assets and AFS assets relative to total financial assets in 2008 and adjusted for the effect of reclassifications. 
Total Assets is the book value of total assets in million Euros as of financial year 2008 and adjusted for the effect of reclassifica-
tions (source: BvD BankScope). Toxic Assets equals one for banks that disclose Alt-A investments for financial year 2008, and 
zero otherwise. CGI Score is a country-specific governance score from Kaufmann et al. (2009). Code Law Country is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if a country has a code law legal origin (33 countries in our sample), and zero otherwise (source: 
CIA World Factbook). MCAP/GDP is the ratio of a country’s stock market capitalization to its Gross Domestic Product (source: 
The World Bank). 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of Reclassification Choice 
 
This table presents the results from multivariate regressions that relate the reclassification choice to various bank variables. The 
dependent variable Recl_Dummmy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank reclassifies trading or AFS assets in 
accordance with IAS 39 in financial year 2008, and zero otherwise (see Table 1). The dependent variable AFSRecl_Dummy is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a bank reclassifies AFS assets in accordance with IAS 39 in financial year 2008, and 
zero otherwise (see Table 1). All independent variables are described in Table 4. The table reports marginal effects at the mean 
(median) of all continuous (binary) independent variables and z-statistics (in parentheses). The z-statistics are based on standard 
errors that are clustered by country. The proportion of correct predictions is scaled according to Veall and Zimmermann (1996). 
McFadden’s (adjusted) R-squared is calculated according to McFadden (1973). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
RQ1 =
Accrual Size
RQ2 = 
Abnormal Spread
RQ1 =
Accrual Size
RQ2 = 
Abnormal Spread
0.017 0.024 0.011 0.018
(3.22)*** (3.45)*** (2.18)** (3.18)***
-0.115 -0.117
(-2.06)** (-2.10)**
-0.278 -0.082 -0.241 -0.085
(-2.29)** (-1.65)* (-2.35)** (-2.66)***
-0.179 -0.173 -0.088 -0.086
(-2.07)** (-2.02)** (-1.58) (-1.48)
1.784 1.915 1.530 1.670
(3.06)*** (3.10)*** (4.83)*** (4.70)***
0.080 0.092
(0.78) (0.79)
0.303 0.290
(2.96)*** (2.41)**
0.082 0.134 0.083 0.120
(1.24) (2.37)** (1.65)* (2.64)***
0.150 0.123 0.154 0.112
(2.85)*** (2.37)** (2.61)*** (2.15)**
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 302 302 302 302
0.74 (0.36) 0.72 (0.32) 0.80 (0.17) 0.80 (0.14)
0.22 (0.18) 0.21 (0.17) 0.24 (0.20) 0.24 (0.19)McFadden's (adjusted) R-squared
Reclassification Potential +
No Loss Target +
No Loss Target * ∆ Customer Deposits +
Exposure to Crisis +
IIF Membership +
Correct predictions (scaled)
Regulatory AFS Prudential Filter -
Reporting Quality -
Existence of Accounting Slack -
Indepedent Variables
Expected
Sign
Dependent Variable: Recl_Dummy Dependent Variable: AFSRecl_Dummy
Regulatory Capital Restriction +
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TABLE 6 
Stock Market Reactions 
 
This table presents analyses of stock market reactions to selected events related to the reclassification amendments and subsequent 
reclassification choices. The first three specifications analyze the cross-sectional determinants of bank-specific abnormal returns 
following the IASB’s official announcement of the amendment to IAS 39 on October 13, 2008. The event window covers two 
days, because the amendment was announced in the late afternoon of October 13, 2008 (GMT) when the exchanges in many 
sample countries had already closed. Expected Reclassification is a proxy for the unobservable market expectations about a 
bank’s eventual reclassification choice. We use three approaches to estimate this proxy. The first approach assumes that investors 
perfectly predict the eventual reclassification choice, i.e. Expected Reclassification equals one if a bank reclassifies ex post, and 
zero otherwise. The second and the third approach are based on fitted probabilities from the determinants model in equation (1) 
using the accrual size (RQ1) and the abnormal bid-ask spread (RQ2) as reporting quality measures. In the latter two specifications, 
Expected Reclassification takes a value of one if the fitted probability is higher than 0.5, and zero otherwise. Regulatory Capital 
Restriction (Dummy – Cut-off 0%) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the difference between an individual bank’s 
total capital ratio before reclassifications and the minimum capital ratio at country level is less than 0% (6 banks in total; 4 of 
these banks eventually reclassify). The coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) for these specifications are based on 
the weighted portfolio approach by Sefcik and Thompson (1986) using the DJ STOXX 1800 market index. R-squared is not ap-
plicable with this approach. The last two specifications analyze the cross-sectional determinants of bank-specific abnormal returns 
to bank-specific reclassification announcements. We use the first reclassification announcement for reclassifying banks and, as 
benchmark announcements, the first earnings announcement for non-reclassifying banks following the official announcement of 
the amendment to IAS 39 in October 2008. Since these dates cannot be identified for all sample banks, the analyses in this table 
are based on a reduced sample of 117 reclassifying and 161 non-reclassifying banks. Of the 117 reclassifying banks, 14 (67) (36) 
announce the reclassification before (during) (after) the respective earnings announcement. 39 of 117 reclassifying banks an-
nounce reclassifications in interim reports prior to the first annual report following the amendment to IAS 39. The dependent 
variable is the prediction error from the market model using the DJ STOXX 1800 market index, with interval (-60, -11) and inter-
val (+11, +60) relative to announcement day 0 as estimation window. We follow the trade-to-trade approach by Maynes and 
Rumsey (1993) to account for thin trading in some of the stocks. Reclassification equals one (zero) for banks that (do not)
Expected
Sign
Perfect
Foresight
RQ1 =
Accrual Size
RQ2 = 
Abnormal Spread
Yes No
-0.007 -0.010 -0.015
(-0.99) (-1.28) (-1.75)*
-0.014
(-1.66)*
0.026 0.025 0.070 -0.015 0.027
(1.59) (1.54) (4.44)*** (-1.83)* (1.55)
0.033 0.037 -0.027
(1.23) (1.42) (-1.07)
0.041
(2.17)**
0.022 0.028
(1.79)* (1.53)
0.030 0.031 0.032 0.004 -0.010
(2.71)*** (2.73)*** (2.89)*** (0.78) (-1.46)
# Observations 302 302 302 278 117
R-squared - - - 0.02 0.02
Additional Tests
0.059 0.062 0.042 0.026
(2.85)*** (3.11)*** (2.10)** (1.53)
Regulatory Capital
Restriction + Interaction
Reclassification
Prediction Model
Earnings Surprise
Dependent Variable: Abn_Return
Reclassification Announcements
Regulatory Capital Restriction
(Dummy - Cut-off 0%)
Dependent Variable: Abn_Return 
13/14 October 2008
Intercept
Independent Variables
Expected Reclassification x
Regulatory Capital Restriction
Expected Reclassification
Benchmark Announcements
Reclassification x
Regulatory Capital Restriction
+
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
announce reclassifications. Regulatory Capital Restriction (Dummy – Cut-off 0%) is defined as in the first three specifications. 
Earnings Surprise is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the earnings number reported at an earnings announcement 
is higher than the mean analysts’ forecast reported by IBES for the last statistical period before the announcement, and zero oth-
erwise. The last two specifications report OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors. In all specifications, ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Reclassification Disclosures and Information Asymmetry 
 
 
This table presents results from regressions that relate bid-ask spreads to the effect of IFRS reclassifications. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the dependent as well as the control variables. All variables are measured at the firm-quarter level. The 
sample comprises of 124 reclassifying and 178 non-reclassifying banks, for a total of 3,467 firm-quarter observations over the 
period 2007Q1 to 2009Q4. Panel B presents results from multi-period difference-in-differences. Bid-Ask Spread is the median of 
the daily closing bid-ask spreads. Reclassification equals one for all reclassification quarters starting with the first quarter during 
which the respective bank announced IFRS reclassifications, and zero otherwise. Complete Disclosure indicates whether a reclas-
sifying bank discloses all six items required by IFRS 7, para. 12A, in the footnotes to its financial statements (see Table 1). Share 
Turnover is the average percentage trading volume (i.e. trading volume in units divided by the number of outstanding shares). 
Market Value (mEuro) is the median market value of outstanding equity in Million Euros. Return Variability is the standard de-
viation of daily stock returns. Panel B reports OLS coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The t-statistics are based 
on standard errors that are clustered by firm and quarter. We use the natural logarithm of the raw values where indicated in the 
panels. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables # Quarters Mean Std. Dev. P1 Median P99
Bid-Ask Spread 3,467 1.60% 3.34% 0.04% 0.66% 16.05%
Share Turnover 3,467 0.25% 0.39% 0.00% 0.10% 1.71%
Market Value (m Euro) 3,467 7,073 16,533 24 1,354 86,608
Return Variability 3,467 2.59% 1.57% 0.64% 2.26% 8.31%
Panel B: Multivariate Regressions
Independent Variables
Expected
Sign
0.143 0.142
(1.78)* (1.86)*
-0.210 -0.319
(-2.00)** (-2.99)***
-0.194
(-7.57)***
-0.322
(-5.17)***
0.305
(6.21)***
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter
# Observations 3,467 3,467
R-squared 0.91 0.92
Additional Tests
-0.067 -0.177
(-0.72) (-2.01)**
Dependent Variable:
Log(Bid-Ask Spread)
Reclassification +
Complete Disclosure -
Log(Return Variability) +
Reclassification + 
Complete Disclosure
0
Log(Share Turnover) -
Log(Market Value) -
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TABLE 8 
Additional Tests 
 
 
This table presents results from additional tests that examine alternative explanations for the findings reported in Table 7. Panel A 
corresponds to Table 7, Panel B, but includes Toxic Assets and Effect on Net Income (raw and interacted with Complete Disclo-
sure) as additional control variables. Panel B presents results from multi-period difference-in-differences analyses that relate bid-
ask spreads to Toxic Assets, Complete Disclosure, and the interaction of these two variables. This analysis focuses on the 124 
reclassifying banks which results 1,428 firm-quarter observations over the period 2007Q1 to 2009Q4. In both Panels, Toxic Assets 
is defined as in Table 4 and set to zero for all quarters before the reclassification amendment became effective in October 2008. 
Effect on Net Income is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the percentage net income effect of the reclassification is 
above the sample median (see Table 2), and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 7.The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Effect on Net Income Partition and Toxic Assets as Control Variable
Independent Variables
Expected
Sign
-0.073 0.130 -0.077
(-1.01) (1.80)* (-1.04)
-0.052 -0.363 -0.082
(-0.48) (-3.01)*** (-0.71)
0.407 0.395
(3.32)*** (3.32)***
-0.501 -0.516
(-3.03)*** (-3.05)***
0.109 0.093
-1.02 -0.92
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter Firm, Quarter
# Observations 3,467 3,467 3,467
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92
Additional Tests
-0.125 -0.233 -0.159
(-1.35) (-2.36)** (-1.63)
0.334 0.318
(3.02)*** (3.01)***
-0.219 -0.280
(-1.89)* (-2.13)**
0
Dependent Variable:
Log(Bid-Ask Spread)
Reclassification + Complete Disclosure +
Effect on Net Income + Interaction Term
0
Reclassification +
Complete Disclosure -
Effect on Net Income +
Complete Disclosure x
Effect on Net Income
-
Toxic Assets +
Reclassification + 
Effect on Net Income
+
Reclassification + 
Complete Disclosure
Panel B: Toxic Assets in lieu of Reclassification
Independent Variables
Expected
Sign
Dependent Variable:
Log(Bid-Ask Spread)
0.479
(2.15)**
-0.117
(-1.02)
-0.661
(-2.58)**
Controls Yes
Fixed Effects Firm, Quarter
Observations 1,428
R-squared 0.93
-
+
-
Complete Disclosure
Toxic Assets
Complete Disclosure x 
Toxic Assets
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